



MID-TERM REVIEW: WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IN YEMEN

OCTOBER 2023



OPTIMUM ANALYSIS

Established in 2019, Optimum Analysis is an Iraq-based research company. Its mission is to contribute to improving humanitarian and development programming, positively impact economic development, and build the capacity of national researchers. By combining the technical skills of international staff with the contextual knowledge of national researchers and adhering to international social science standards, Optimum Analysis can deliver the highest quality data and analysis.



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CARE International is a global confederation of 14 member organizations. CARE works around the globe to save lives, defeat poverty, and achieve social justice. CARE Nederland was established in 2001. CARE Nederland supports people in some of the world's most challenging places to establish a better existence by providing humanitarian assistance, supporting women's rights and facilitating communities to develop sustainable livelihoods.



CARE has been continuously active in Yemen since 1993. CARE Yemen delivers programmes through direct implementation and in partnership with local and international organizations, providing emergency and recovery assistance. These interventions contribute to strengthening communities' resilience to cope and recover from the effects of the current humanitarian crisis.

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SOS Foundation for Development is a non-profit organization founded by a group of Yemeni youth and civil society activists. The SOS Foundation seeks to empower Yemeni youth and build their capabilities to engage meaningfully in civil society. The SOS Foundation works on various development projects across Yemen, focusing on gender equality.



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ABBREVIATIONS

CAPI	Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DoC	Domain of Change
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KII	Key Informant Interview
MoSAL	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSESGY	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
PSEA	Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SO	Sub-Objective
SOS	SOS Center for Youth Capabilities Development
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WPS	Women, Peace and Security



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The civil war in Yemen has led to the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world, disproportionately impacting women and girls. The crisis has further deepened gender inequalities and women's vulnerabilities to violence and harassment. Further amplifying the situation are poor policy implementation, a shrinking civic space - particularly for women's organisations - and a retreat in recent hard won gains around women's voices and leadership within peacebuilding processes.

Despite these realities, the context in Yemen offers significant opportunities for advancing the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Recognizing this need and opportunity, SOS Foundation for Development (short: SOS Foundation), CARE Yemen, RNW Media, and two implementing partners (Manasati30 and Generation without Qat), as part of an international consortium led by CARE Nederland, have been implementing the WPS3 in Yemen since 2021. The WPS3 is a strategic partnership funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under the Strengthening Civil Society Policy Framework. It is a five-year initiative that seeks to contribute to lasting peace and to building a more equal society through addressing both women's immediate needs and the underlying causes of their limited inclusion in relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes.

The Consortium commissioned Optimum Analysis to conduct a mid-term review of the WPS3 programme, covering the first half of programme implementation (1 January 2021 – 30 June 2023). The main purpose of the mid-term review is to assess the overall achievements and effectiveness of the WPS3 programme at the mid-point and provide recommendations on how the Partnership could be improved in moving forward.

Key Findings

Overall

The mid-term evaluation reached the following conclusions about the programme overall:

- The context in Yemen has become even more challenging for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) over the past two years, and doubly so for NGOs and CSOs working on gender equality or women's protection. In this context, even small achievements are significant, given the significant barriers and sensitivities.
- The first phase of the programme has notable achievements in terms of the number of activities completed, such as the number of people trained or the number of advocacy initiatives. This provides a solid foundation for the second phase of the programme to build on.
- The theory of change and results framework requires minor adjustments to create a more strategic focus and ensure that targets are feasible. However, the overall programme logic remains relevant and coherent.
- The consortium has utilized the strengths and expertise of each member effectively, and there are numerous good practices and innovative approaches. There is room to improve on collaboration and shared tactics on advocacy and engagement of powerholders.
- Some meaningful steps have been taken towards localization and a genuine shift in power to the global South. There is an opportunity in the next phase to strengthen this by supporting the Yemen-based consortium members to take a stronger role in governance of the consortium, and by shifting to a mentorship approach with CSOs.
- The partnership between the consortium and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Embassy is a strength of the program. In the second phase, there is an opportunity for the consortium to better 'internationalize' its advocacy and engage more with Yemen's 1325 National Action Plan, and the partnership with MoFA could play a key role.
- The consortium has identified a number of pathways and practices to achieve sustainability that appear promising, but still have some way to go in order to be effective.
- Social norm change is complex and long-term, and in order to maximise the programme's impact, consortium members should identify and focus on a more narrow set of specific norms.



Long-term Outcomes

The programme established three long-term outcomes (known as sub-objectives). Overall, the mid-term review found that some progress towards some long-term outcomes has been achieved. However, the data paints a complex picture and contextual factors have also contributed to a loss of progress in some areas. It is important to read these findings in light of the significant challenges in the Yemen context.

Sub-Objective 1: More equitable social norms and related practices

- Norms around SGBV have, at best, remained poor and, at worst, deteriorated. Security for women in public space is worse now than two years ago.
- Social norms related to women's roles in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes were viewed differently depending on the person's profile:
 - a) Data collected directly by Manasati30 showed a positive impact on people who participated in its online forums, including behavioural change and a shift in personal perspectives.
 - b) Data collected for the mid-term review found that people who had at least some exposure to WPS programming (i.e. programme stakeholders and beneficiaries) felt that social norms have improved over the past two years and that women now play a much more prominent role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities.
 - c) However, the randomised community sample told the opposite story, that women's participation has *decreased* in the past two years and that there is increased negativity and criticism against female participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities. There was one positive finding, which is a decrease in the number of men who oppose women's participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities.
- The layered impact on social norms raises a question for the consortium of whose norms they are trying to change – participants, or the wider community? This is linked to *when* progress is measured: a shift in perspective by individual participants is feasible in the short-term, whereas a shift in social norms at community level is a much longer goal.
- Several contextual factors explain the regression in social norms: a general lack of trust in the peace processes, the influence of restrictive policies targeting women, and a public campaign against NGOs that may not only have swayed opinions but also made it socially unacceptable to state support for women's involvement in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding.

Sub-Objective 2: Enhanced protection for women

Overall, the protection environment for women has further deteriorated. However, a number of achievements by the programme contributed to enhanced protection for women. This includes:

- SOS rehabilitated and supported a number of SGBV centres
- Manasati30 prepared a mapping of SGBV services, which was made available to women within the Consortium's network
- Almost one-third of CSOs could identify instances where local authorities contributed to SGBV protection, prevention, and response.
- Authorities took some positive steps towards enhancing women's leadership, such as setting up community committees or village councils and ensuring the involvement of women.

Sub-Objective 3 (S3): More inclusive relief, recovery, and peace processes

- People's perceptions of women's actual participation in relief, recovery and peacebuilding activities varied based on their proximity to NGOs. Those who had some exposure to NGOs felt strongly that women's involvement in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities has increased over the past two years. However, the randomised community sample found the opposite, with a regression in perceived participation.
- One contextual factor that explains the perceived regression is that a substantial campaign was launched against women in public spaces and against women working for local NGOs in 2022,



accusing women who worked for NGOs or CSOs of unethical behaviour. This had a profound impact on women's engagement with NGOs and in public spaces more generally.

- Even though men's opposition to women's participation decreased, this did not lead to more actual participation (in the perception of community members.) This highlights that there is no linear relationship between a change in social norms and behaviour change.

Intermediate Outcomes

The study also focused on the four intermediate outcomes, known as domains. Overall, we found that the consortium has made significant progress in meeting its targets under the four domains. However, some activities should be adapted (or even removed) in the next phase to improve effectiveness and the likelihood of meeting the long-term outcomes.

Domain 1 (D1): Civil Society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence.

- CSOs carried out a substantial number of advocacy activities. However, this was not evenly distributed and some conducted multiple advocacy activities while others conducted none.
- Inter-organisational linkages were substantially improved. However,
- The capacity of CSOs appears to have plateaued. There was little improvement in terms of the creation and use of an advocacy strategy; a decrease in relationship with authorities and other powerholders; and a decline in the degree to which CSOs involved the community in developing advocacy messages and initiatives.
- Several contextual factors may explain this plateau. CSO members are now more aware of what it means to be 'do advocacy' and therefore may self-rate themselves lower compared to the baseline study. The relationship with powerholders may have declined due to the fraught civic space in Yemen and the difficulties that CSOs face from the authorities. And the campaign against CSOs required that they take a lower profile approach, which may have undermined their community engagement efforts.
- Together, these factors suggest that the programme would benefit from more intensive mentorship of CSOs, with a focus on developing their maturity as civil society actors in a holistic sense.

Domain 2 (D2): Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership.

- The consortium is on track to achieving its targets of encouraging men in the community to support women's positive contributions and leadership.
- There were examples of men acting as allies: Over 15% of respondents reported that they personally had spoken out against discriminatory gender norms in the past year, and 10% had observed an influential community member speaking out against harmful gender norms. These findings align with the findings in sub-objective one that men's opposition to women's role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding has decreased.
- Men's opposition to women's participation was significantly higher in Taiz than in Aden, indicating more conservative attitudes. Support for women's participation in all activities was similar in both Taiz and Aden, although respondents in Taiz tended to have more polarised views.

Domain 3 (D3): Formal and informal powerholders are more supportive and responsive to women.

- The consortium's work appears to have influenced the positive change in attitudes and behaviours of (male) powerholders.
- The consortium carried out a range of training on SGBV with local authorities and powerholders who have a mandate or responsibility to address SGBV, including both men and women. The training appears to have had an impact beyond increasing the knowledge and capacities of male powerholders.
- Authorities took several positive steps towards enhancing women's leadership, such as setting up community committees or village councils and ensuring the involvement of women. Almost one-



third of CSOs could identify instances where local authorities contributed to SGBV protection, prevention, and response.

Domain 4 (D4): Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes.

- Training was most effective when used strategically to achieve higher outcomes, such as advocacy goals or leadership opportunities for women.
- Some of the seed grants provided to women-led CSOs led to concrete changes in women's leadership and inclusion.

Recommendations

The evaluation identified the following priority focus areas for the second half of the programme:

Enhance collaboration within the consortium:

- Strengthen coordination and integration of activities between consortium partners
- Enhance the relationship between online and offline activities
- Develop joint strategies related to advocacy and engagement of powerholders
- Strengthen the role of Yemen-based organizations in the governance and management of the consortium

Intensify the collaboration model with CSOs:

- Offer ongoing mentorship to a smaller number of CSOs, chosen based on agreed criteria (including advocacy capacity, location, and organisational maturity)
- Support CSOs to mature in their advocacy efforts and as civil society actors more broadly
- Identify CSOs with similar advocacy goals and common constituencies and help them develop joint advocacy goals and campaigns
- Use training strategically rather than 'only' as a capacity-building activity

Look beyond the local landscape:

- Engage more with international platforms on the Women in Peace and Security agenda
- Connect more with the multilateral and international discussions surrounding Yemen
- Develop advocacy messages and activities relevant to a national or international audience

Invest in building sustainability:

- More targeted investment in CSOs
- Expand the work with role models offline
- Advocate support for political decisions that enhance women's leadership but that might be controversial for communities or authorities
- Integrate issues related to climate change to the consortium's collaboration with CSOs
- Build local ownership of the consortium's online platforms



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME

The civil war in Yemen has led to the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world, disproportionately impacting women and girls. The crisis has further deepened gender inequalities and women's vulnerabilities to violence and harassment. Further amplifying the situation are poor policy implementation, a shrinking civic space - particularly for women's organisations - and a retreat in recent hard won gains around women's voices and leadership within peacebuilding processes.¹

Despite the above, the context in Yemen offered significant opportunities for advancing the WPS agenda at the start of the programme. For example, Yemen adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS and female activists, youth and CSOs continued to advance women's participation in peace processes and humanitarian decision-making, despite facing several major challenges. Additionally, women were already active as first responders in peacebuilding and conflict resolutions within their communities, there were some indications of shifting gender norms among men, and Yemen was going through a digital revolution, thereby increasing opportunities for women's inclusion.²

In response to the above, SOS Foundation for Development (short: SOS Foundation), CARE Yemen, RNW Media, and two implementing partners (Manasati30 and Generation without Qat), as part of an international consortium led by CARE Nederland, have been implementing the WPS3 in Yemen since 2021. The WPS3 is a strategic partnership funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under the Strengthening Civil Society Policy Framework. It is a five-year initiative that seeks to contribute to lasting peace and to building a more equal society through addressing both women's immediate needs and the underlying causes of their limited inclusion in relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes.

To achieve this overarching goal, the programme focuses on three sub-objectives:

- Sub-Objective 1 (S1): More equitable social norms and related practices
- Sub-Objective 2 (S2): Enhanced protection for women
- Sub-Objective 3 (S3): More inclusive relief, recovery, and peace processes

To achieve the sub-objectives, changes are required among four key groups of actors, which represent the domains of change in WPS3:

- Domain 1 (D1): Civil Society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence.
- Domain 2 (D2): Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership.
- Domain 3 (D3): Formal and informal powerholders are more supportive and responsive to women.
- Domain 4 (D4): Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE MID-TERM REVIEW

Optimum Analysis was commissioned to conduct an MTR of the WPS3, covering the first half of programme implementation (1 January 2021 – 30 June 2023). The main purpose of the MTR is to assess the overall achievements and effectiveness of the WPS3 programme at the mid-point and provide recommendations on how the Partnership could be improved in moving forward. The focus of the MTR was two-fold, as shown on the next page.

¹ CARE, RNW Media, and SOS Foundation (October 2020) Women, Peace and Security: Full proposal to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a strategic partnership, women, peace and security grant instrument

² Ibid.



Programme level:

- Assess achievements to date on the outputs and outcomes indicators that are linked to the selected basket indicators (quantitative reporting and qualitative information), as well as the overall WPS3 indicators against the baseline study conducted in 2021.
- Determine the contribution of the WPS programme in the measured changes related to the selected basket indicators.
- Assess the Theory of Change validity, including the assumptions underpinning the ToC.
- Assess the risks identified at the start of the programme and their current relevance to the programme (including SEAH, fraud and corruption).
- Assess the sustainability of the outcomes of the interventions and exit strategy.
- Linkages of the interventions with cross-cutting themes (gender, youth, and climate) and recommendations on how to incorporate these better into the programme.
- Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement for the remainder of the project period.

Partnership level:

- Evaluate collaboration within the Partnership, and more specifically, assess whether the programme is contributing towards shifting power to the South.
- Determine best practices and recommendations with regard to the strategic Partnership with the Ministry and the Embassies.



2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The evaluation utilised a mixed methods approach, including quantitative data, qualitative data, and a desk review. The desk review comprised programming documents (including the programme proposal, baseline study, and annual reports). Data collection took place in August and September 2023.

Data collection: Overall Approach

Data collection took place in two phases:

1. Phase 1 included a household survey, a CSO and media partner survey, and a desk review of programme documents. The primary purpose of Phase 1 was to identify outcomes achieved by the programme, which were then examined in more depth in the second phase of data collection. The two-phase approach meant that we could tailor the key informant interviews and focus group discussions to address trends or themes identified in Phase 1.
2. Phase 2, which included key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and a vignette study. A key purpose of Phase 2 was to conduct a contribution analysis for a targeted number of indicators, drawing on the findings in Phase 1.

Data was collected via a partnership with Felix Consulting, a Yemeni research company. Optimum Analysis provided training to the enumerators that covered the research tools, respondent selection, interviewing/surveying techniques, ethical concerns, logistical plans, and security procedures.

Data collection: Household Survey

One hundred fifty (150) household surveys were collected. This included 75 surveys in Aden and 75 in Taiz, the governorates where the programme is implemented. Overall, 60% of respondents were female and 40% male. The majority of respondents were classified as youth (60%), followed by adults (35%), and a small minority as elderly (5%). The enumerators identified 25% of respondents as belonging to the Muhamasheen. Details on education are found in the table below.

Table 1. Demographics MTR sample

Demographic	Aden (n=75)		Taiz (n=75)	
	#	%	#	%
Female	45	60%	45	60%
Male	30	40%	30	40%
Muhamasheen	19	25%	19	25%
Youth: 18 to 30 years old	45	60%	45	60%
Adults: 31 to 59 years old	26	35%	26	35%
Elderly: 60+	4	5%	4	5%
No education	6	8%	10	13%
Primary education	22	29%	14	19%
Secondary education	29	39%	20	27%
University education	18	24%	31	41%

Overall, 17% of the respondents self-identified as having a disability (15% in Aden and 19% in Taiz), and rates were fairly similar between men and women (18% versus 16%).³ Respondents in Taiz were

³ The survey utilised questions from the Washington Group (WG) to collect information about various disabilities within the sample. This set of questions includes questions that ask whether individuals have difficulty performing basic activities, including walking, seeing, hearing, cognition, self-care, and communication. Although these questions will identify most individuals with disabilities, the questions were not designed to measure all aspects of difficulty in functioning that individuals may experience. Following the SOS Foundation's instructions, individuals were categorised as disabled only if they reported a lot of difficulty in at least one of these functional areas. See: <http://www.washingtongroup-disability.com/washington-group-question-sets/short-set-of-disability-questions/>



more likely to participate in relief or peacebuilding work than in Aden (11% in Taiz compared to 1% in Aden), with slightly more women than men currently engaged in such activities. Engagement in relief or peacebuilding work was lower among Muhamasheen respondents.⁴

16% of respondents with a disability reported that they are currently involved in relief or peacebuilding work, likely reflecting the deliberate efforts of peacebuilding and relief organisations to promote inclusiveness. However, the percentage of male respondents with a disability currently engaged in peacebuilding activities (27%) is much higher than that of females (7%), indicative of a gender disparity in the involvement of persons with disabilities in relief and peacebuilding work. This aligns with a study on social norms that CARE completed in 2023, which found that women with disabilities is that they are extra vulnerable and cannot go out and work without a male guardian.⁵

It was ensured that that sample of community members would be comparable to the sample from the baseline (See: Table 2) in terms of gender, age groups, disability status, and Muhamasheen status. However, there are differences between the two samples in terms of educational attainment. Educational attainment was higher among respondents included in the baseline (university education: 59%) than in the MTR (university education: 33%). The variance in educational attainment between the baseline and MTR samples may introduce a source of bias or influence the results in various ways. It could affect the comparability of findings between the two assessments and may need to be considered when drawing conclusions about the impact of the programme. The difference in educational backgrounds could influence how respondents perceive and engage with the programme’s activities. To mitigate this limitation, an analysis of the difference between survey respondents with no to secondary education versus those with university education on several key variables. When large differences were found, these findings were considered when drawing conclusions.

Table 2. Demographics baseline sample

Demographic	Aden (n=77)		Taiz (n=92)	
	#	%	#	%
Female	48	62%	55	60%
Male	29	38%	37	40%
Muhamasheen	5	10%	7	14%
Youth: 18 to 30 years old	45	58%	55	60%
Adults: 31 to 59 years old	27	35%	35	38%
Elderly: 60+	5	6%	2	2%
No education	3	4%	1	1%
Primary education	12	16%	10	11%
Secondary education	23	30%	19	21%
University education	39	51%	60	65%

Data collection: CSO and Media Organisation Survey

In total, 26 surveys were conducted: 22 with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and 4 with Media Organisations (Mos). Most surveys were completed by the heads of the CSO/MO, with a minority being completed by lower-level staff (e.g. managers, officers, assistants, etc.). CSO/MO survey respondents were randomly selected from lists with CSO/MO contacts provided by the consortium partners.

An important note is that 12 CSO/MO surveys were conducted in person, while 14 surveys were completed online independently by the respective CSO/MO. Given the potential impact on the data of this difference in the survey modality, certain questions will be analysed separately based on the mode of survey administration (in-person vs. online). However, it’s important to note that variations

⁴ When divided by gender, female Muhamasheen are less likely to currently engage in such work (4%) than male Muhamasheen (7%). However, a higher percentage of female Muhamasheen report engaging in such work in the past (4%) than male Muhamasheen (0%).

⁵ CARE, *Study of social norms affecting the inclusion of women in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding in Yemen*, March 2023.



between these groups may also be influenced by location, as online surveys were primarily conducted with CSOs/Mos operating in Aden. In contrast, in-person surveys were predominantly conducted with CSOs/Mos operating in Taiz.

On average, the CSOs/Mos employed nine full-time employees (ranging from 0 to 25) and 12 part-time employees (ranging from 1 to 30). Regarding gender distribution, an average of five full-time employees were female (ranging from 0 to 16), while seven part-time employees were female. Among the CSOs/Mos, 14 (54%) were led by women, 9 (35%) were led by youth, and 3 (12%) were neither led by women nor youth.

Table 3. Geographical area of focus CSO/MO

	Aden	Taiz	Aden and Taiz	Total
In-person survey	0	7	5	12
Online survey	10	0	2	14

Data collection: Qualitative

Respondents for KIIs were either identified by CARE Nederland (i.e. MFA and Embassy staff, consortium partners) or randomly selected from lists provided by CARE/SOS/Manasati30 (i.e. CSO, formal and informal powerholders, seed grant beneficiaries, and influencers).

Table 4. Qualitative data collection

Qualitative Methods		
Method	Category / Number	Total
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MFA and Embassy staff (2 in total) - Consortium partners (7 in total) - CSOs that participated in training (6 in total) - Formal/informal powerholders (4 in total) - Seed grant beneficiaries (3 in total) - Influencers (2 in total) 	24 in total
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Vignette Study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Women (1 per Taiz/Aden, 2 in total) - Men (1 per Taiz/Aden, 2 in total) - Muhamasheen women (1 per Taiz/Aden, 2 in total) 	6 in total

Respondents for FGDs were identified partly by Felix Consulting (randomly selected community members) in collaboration with SOS (nominated individuals involved in the WPS programme).

Contribution Analysis

Contribution analysis is a methodology that can be used to determine if an intervention contributed to an already observed result (including in what way the intervention contributed) based on verifying solid theories of change.⁶ Contribution analysis aims at arriving at credible claims on the intervention as a contributory cause, i.e., that the intervention was one of several necessary or likely necessary factors in a causal package that together brought about or influenced the changes observed.⁷

Contribution analysis typically assumes that outcomes have already been observed. However, in situations where outcomes are yet to be determined, as in this MTR, a two-phase data collection approach is necessary. The initial phase is dedicated to establishing the programme's outcomes. Once these outcomes have been observed, the second phase can then focus on contribution analysis. This sequential approach ensures that a solid foundation of programme outcomes is in place before attempting to ascertain the programme's specific contributions. It allows for a more precise and evidence-based understanding of how the program has influenced the observed results, making the evaluation process both systematic and comprehensive.

⁶ Mayne, J. (2011). Contribution Analysis: Addressing Cause and Effect. In Evaluating the Complex. R. Schwartz, K. Forss and M. Marra, Eds. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers: 53-96.

⁷ Mayne, J. (2012). "Contribution Analysis: Coming of Age?" Evaluation 18(3): 270-280.



This MTR aimed to utilize contribution analysis for a targeted set of indicators, in order to understand the contribution that the consortium had made to any identified change, as well as the other factors that may have contributed to that change. The contribution analysis is integrated into the relevant sections of this report, and a summary of the target questions are set out below:

Table 5. Contribution analysis indicators and questions

Indicator	Outcome Question	Contribution Analysis Questions
<p>WRGE 1.1 # of laws, policies, and strategies blocked, adopted, or improved to eradicate all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private life</p> <p>WRGE 4.1 # of laws, policies, and strategies blocked, adopted, or improved to promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention, peace- and state-building and protect women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations (link SCS2)</p>	<p>Question Did the online and offline activities as part of domains 2 and 3 influence a change or did the interventions make an important contribution to a change?</p>	<p>Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How and why did a change occur? 2. What role did an intervention play in bringing the change about? 3. What conditions are needed to make this kind of intervention succeed in the future?
<p>WRGE 2.2 # of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on <i>women’s voice, agency, leadership and representative participation in decision-making processes in the public, private, and civic sphere, through agenda setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building</i></p> <p>WRGE 4.2 # of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on <i>promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention and peace- and state-building and protecting women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations, through agenda setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building</i></p>	<p>Question Did the CSOs in the programme contribute to political agenda setting or did they make an important contribution to a political debate?</p>	<p>Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How and why did a change occur? 2. What political role did CSOs play in bringing the change about? 3. What conditions are needed to make this kind of intervention succeed in the future?
<p>SCS4 # of advocacy initiatives carried out by CSOs, for, by or with their membership/constituency</p>	<p>Question Did the advocacy initiatives by CSOs influence a change or did they make an important contribution to a change?</p>	<p>Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How and why did a change occur? 2. What role did the advocacy interventions play in bringing the change about? 3. What conditions are needed to make this kind of intervention succeed in the future?



<p>S3.1 Signs of more women taking up roles as relief/recovery and peacebuilders at local and national levels</p>	<p>Question Did the seed grants provided to women influence a change or did the grants make an important contribution to a change?</p>	<p>Questions 1. How and why did a change occur? 2. What role did the seed-grants play in bringing the change about? 3. What conditions are needed to make this kind of intervention succeed in the future?</p>
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However, a significant challenge arose when the first phase of data collection revealed a lack of positive changes and even regression in many social norms instead. This unexpected outcome prompted a shift in focus towards understanding why the anticipated changes hadn't materialized. Consequently, we adapted the analysis to include questions aimed at uncovering the factors that were either facilitating or impeding progress in social norms, given the uncertainty surrounding the specific positive changes that were expected. This adjustment was crucial in addressing the complexity of the situation and provided insights into the factors influencing the observed outcomes.

2.2 CHALLENGES, BIAS, AND LIMITATIONS

A number of limitations may impact the reliability and validity of the findings in this report. First and foremost, Women in Peace and Security is a highly sensitive topic in Yemen, raising concerns among evaluators regarding potential negative reactions from respondents, the wider community, or authorities during data collection. We customised the methodology by engaging a Yemeni partner for data collection to address this. Utilizing national actors, who often face fewer obstacles from authorities than international actors and are likely to be more approachable by community members, helped mitigate these risks. Additionally, we matched the gender of enumerators and responders (so women interviewed women, for example). Finally, we employed multiple methods for data triangulation to uphold data quality and addressed potential unwillingness to discuss specific topics or in certain forums.

Second, the MTR process utilised contribution analysis to assess the consortium's impact on key indicators. This involved a two-tiered data collection approach. The initial phase aimed to pinpoint positive changes that had transpired since the inception of the WPS programme, utilizing quantitative methods such as a household survey. The second phase was then expected to determine the contribution of the WPS programme in achieving that change. One complication was that the first phase did not reveal many positive changes; instead, a regression was observed for most social norms. This meant that contribution analysis primarily focused on why a change had *not* taken place. In order to do so, we included questions to identify factors contributing to or hindering the progression of social norms, given the ambiguity surrounding the specific positive changes that had occurred.

Considering the above-mentioned challenge, it's important to emphasize that measuring social norms and tracking changes in such norms presents a multifaceted challenge. For instance, social norms are inherently subjective and context-dependent, making them challenging to quantify accurately. Different individuals may interpret and respond to norms differently, and these variations can be difficult to capture in quantitative data. Additionally, quantitative data may struggle to capture the nuanced changes and adaptations within social norms. This is even more so when relying on a small sample as is the case for this MTR. Collecting qualitative data can mitigate some of the above-mentioned challenges but also presents several new challenges. Qualitative data can provide rich insights into the context and nature of social norms but may not be easily quantifiable, making it challenging to measure and compare changes over time. Moreover, social norms often interact with multiple other factors, such as cultural, economic, and political influences. Isolating the specific impact of social norms from these various influences can be intricate, even with qualitative data.



Third, the fact that 12 CSO/MO surveys were conducted in person and 14 via email (similar to the previous baseline) has various implications for the collected data and the comparability of the results. For instance, in-person surveys may elicit different responses than email surveys due to interaction with the researcher. In-person surveys may have higher reliability and accuracy as the researcher can clarify questions and ensure that the respondent understands the questions well, and CSOs/MOs interviewed in person may be more (or less) inclined to share certain views, experiences, or opinions compared to those who responded via email. Furthermore, it is possible that some CSOs/MOs were more inclined to accept in-person (or email) surveys than others, potentially affecting the representativeness of the sample. Finally, some questions were also asked during the baseline, which have been compared with the MTR data. Since the baseline was conducted via email and the MTR partially through in-person surveys and partially via email, this could influence the comparison with the previous results. More specifically, any differences cannot solely be attributed to changes in the situation but also to the change in the data collection method. To mitigate this issue, footnotes are used in the report to give the data broken down by survey modality (i.e. in-person vs. online) for variables from the CSO/MO survey that this difference in modality may have impacted.

Fourth, when the methodology for the MTR was designed, it was assumed that the same CSOs/MOs would be surveyed as those surveyed during the baseline. This would allow for a comparison between the baseline and MTR. However, since the CSOs/MOs who were interviewed during the baseline were not all included in the WSP programme, it was decided to focus on the CSOs that were targeted so far. As such, the CSOs/MOs included in the baseline sample are not included in the MTR sample, which has implications for the interpretation of the data. This disparity between the CSOs/MOs surveyed in the baseline and those included in the MTR could impact the validity of comparing the two sets of data. It may introduce biases and limitations, potentially influencing the overall assessment of the programme's progress and effectiveness. This needs to be taken into account when drawing conclusions and making decisions based on the MTR findings.

Fifth, there are some limitations related to the selection of KII participants. For instance, the initial plan was to complete four KIIs with seed grant beneficiaries, two with CSOs who received a grant and two with individuals who received a grant. For this, Felix Consulting was given a list of contacts of CSOs and individuals who received such grants. While it was possible to complete the two interviews with individuals who received a seed grant, only one CSO who received a seed grant was willing to participate in the evaluation (from a list of five CSOs that received seed grants). As such, the data regarding seed grants for CSOs is insufficiently covered from the perspective of the beneficiaries as it is based only on one beneficiary's opinion. Caution is necessary when interpreting the data, as drawing conclusions solely from the one interviewed CSO's data is not advisable. Instead, conclusions should only be reached when the CSO data is triangulated with information from other stakeholder groups (e.g consortium partners, formal and informal powerholders, etc.).

Sixth, interviewed powerholders were more involved in the programme than initially thought. For example, during the interviews, it became clear that two of the four powerholders interviewed had also functioned as trainers for the programme, possibly influencing their perception of the programme objectives. Moreover, three out of the four interviewed powerholders were female. In some ways, this is helpful because we get the perspective of a female powerholder (and what would support them in their leadership role). On the other hand, it means that the perception of male powerholders is less covered.

Seventh, and linked to the previous two limitations, the qualitative data is almost entirely sourced from people who have an association with the program (such as consortium staff, trainers, CSOs, and seed grant recipients). Given that qualitative data provides the opportunity to examine issues in depth and with a greater degree of nuance, this gives a stronger voice to sources with a subjective connection to the program. There may also be a degree of bias from people associated with the program: courtesy bias from those who benefited from the programme, and insider bias from those who are involved in delivering the programme. The evaluation attempts to balance this by utilizing a mixed methodology and triangulating qualitative data with quantitative data that was collected from



unaffiliated community members, Where the views of affiliated and unaffiliated respondents differ, we have explained which perspective we have given greater weight and why.

Eighth, the evaluation team that completed the mid-term review also completed the baseline study, which undermines their independence from the original results framework (noting, however, that the baseline study did not develop the theory of change or activities.) We address this by taking an evidence-based approach to analysing the framework, theory of change, and results to date.

And finally, ninth, Manasati30 has undertaken a significant number of activities through its online platform, but the MTR design does not factor in the perspectives of their beneficiaries. This stems from a decision to adhere to the methodology employed during the baseline, which involved the completion of vignettes with FGD respondents. Essentially, due to constraints in both time and budget, the MTR could only accommodate either the completion of vignettes with community members or the execution of an online survey targeting Manasati30's beneficiaries. One argument in favor of conducting the online survey was its potential to provide a direct evaluation of the impact on Manasati30's beneficiaries. However, it was decided not to proceed with the survey, opting instead to complete the vignettes with community members. This choice was made to facilitate an examination of changes in social norms within the broader population, encompassing both programme beneficiaries and community members not involved in the programme. This decision may limit the MTR's ability to offer a comprehensive assessment of Manasati30's online activities and their direct impact on the beneficiaries. It may also overlook the unique perspectives and experiences of these beneficiaries, potentially affecting the depth and accuracy of the evaluation. Additionally, by focusing on social norms among the general population, the MTR may provide valuable insights but miss out on a more targeted and detailed understanding of the programme's effects on its primary audience. These considerations should be kept in mind when interpreting the MTR findings.



3. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

3.1 UPDATE IN CONTEXT

This section briefly discusses relevant changes in the context, focusing on changes that have taken place in the past two years, since the programme commenced.

Several significant changes took place in Yemen in 2022. A truce between the warring parties became effective on 2 April 2022, halting military operations. Although the truce formally expired in October 2022, the overall military situation in Yemen has remained relatively stable since, and 2022 was the calmest year since the war started. The security situation in Aden has become better than in recent years. However, the situation in Taiz did not see any changes: roads to the city are still closed, and going to the city remains difficult and risky.

Due to the truce and associated stability, the humanitarian situation improved somewhat, and the rate of people suffering from the worst level of hunger - known as Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 5, or IPC5 - dropped to zero. However, Yemen remains a staggering emergency, with more than 17 million people counting on aid agencies for assistance and protection in 2023. In addition, the truce did little to improve the economic situation, and 2022 witnessed the highest inflation in a decade, and food prices rose substantially.

Limited formal progress has taken place on Yemen's National Action Plan on Women in Peace and Security. On 7 April 2022, the former Yemeni president, Abd Rabbu Mansour, announced that he was transferring the power of the presidency to an eight-man presidential council led by Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi (effectively removing himself from office). In a move that undermined women's leadership and participation, the presidential council was (and remains) comprised of eight men with zero representation of women. However, in a rare positive sign for women's inclusion, the Presidential Leadership Council appointed Judge Sabah al-Alwani as the first woman in the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial authority in the country.⁸

Gender-based violence remains a key concern for women. Although there has been a decrease in violence across front lines thanks to the truce and peace negotiations, there are indications of an uptick in local and tribal conflict across Yemen over land, blood feuds, family quarrels, and economic disputes related to levies and revenues.⁹ In addition, traditional Yemeni social values that focus on protecting women and that hold attacks on them during wartime as shameful (as per the concept of *du'afa*) are also showing signs of erosion. Over the past eight years, women have been subjected to targeting by snipers, detention and forced disappearances, sexual violence, and displacement, pointing to unprecedented forms of violence that have emerged with the war.¹⁰ In the north of Yemen, in areas under the control of Ansar Allah, social repression intensified, and women were forbidden to travel without a male *mahram*. The evaluation team heard reports that although this requirement does not strictly apply in areas under control of the Internationally Recognised Government, there were still instances where security actors or male community members expected women to travel with a *mahram*.

Since the start of the conflict, civic space has shrunk significantly and remains highly restricted. The operational context for civil society actors and NGOs remains unpredictable. During 2022, there was a large-scale disinformation campaign against local and international organizations,

⁸ <https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2022/09/13/yemeni-women-celebrate-countrys-shift-towards-gender-equality/>

⁹ ACAPS, *Yemen: Social impact monitoring project report: January – March 2023*. Available at: https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230620_ACAPS_Thematic_report_Yemen_social_impact_monitoring_project_report_January-March_2023.pdf

¹⁰ Maryam Alkubati, Huda Jafar and Esham Al-Eryani, 'Grassroots voices: women and everyday peacebuilding in Yemen.' Sanaa CEnter for Strategic Studies. April 2023.



by a large number of people, including religious conservative leaders, especially in Taiz. Care Yemen was one of the NGOs that was targeted by name. Since the war began, the Houthis have been defaming women activists and civil society organizations, labeling them as a “soft power” that serves a foreign agenda and conducts “unethical” work. The Houthis use media and social media to promote these attacks. A recent disinformation campaign over social media has tried to link Yemeni women working in civil society and peacebuilding organizations to foreign networks that want to “ruin” Yemen and also accused them of engaging in “unethical” behaviour. The Yemeni government did not take any steps to curb such attacks or punish the perpetrators, which led to normalizing the stigmatization of the work of women’s rights and civil society organizations across Yemen.¹¹ This creates significant additional barriers for WPS-related programming.

Finally, digital access remains an areas of growth in Yemen. Access to the internet has increased by roughly 2 per cent each year, with 9.1 million internet users in Yemen at the start of 2023, compared with 7.9 million in 2020.¹² This is roughly one-quarter of the population (26.7 per cent as at early 2023). Social media use remains the same, at roughly 3 million users.¹³ The need to counter online harassment of women remains a concern, continuing existing trends.¹⁴

¹¹ <https://dawnmena.org/how-to-engage-yemeni-civil-society-and-women-in-peace/>

¹² <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-yemen>

¹³ <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-yemen>

¹⁴ UNWOMEN, “Violence against women in the online space: insights from a multi-country study in the Arab States”. The study, published in 2021 surveyed some 11,500 male and female Internet users over the age of 18 in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen.

See: https://arabstates.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20Arab%20States/Attachments/Publications/2021/11/Summary_Keyfindings_Final_EN.pdf



4. OVERALL RESULTS

This section discusses the progress of the programme’s long-term and intermediate outcomes. It sets out the indicators relevant to each outcome, including the WPS and IATI indicators. Contribution analysis for selected indicators is integrated into the relevant section.¹⁵ There is some overlap between the long-term and intermediate outcomes and for the sake of brevity, we do not repeat all the relevant datapoints in both sections. Given the interconnectedness between (and within) the long-term and intermediate outcomes, we encourage that the report be read holistically.

4.1 LONG-TERM OUTCOMES

Overall, it appears that some progress towards some long-term outcomes has been made although the data paints a complex picture.

S01: More equitable social norms and related practices

WPS Indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
Signs of change in discriminatory social norms and related practices including SGBV	0	2	6
Number and percentage of men that condemn harmful gender norms and related practices	0	315 % N/A	1,000 70%
IATI indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
# of governmental policies & strategies blocked, adopted or improved to eradicate all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private life (WRGE 1.1)	0	0	2
# of by-laws blocked, adopted or improved to eradicate all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private life	0	0	2

The first long-term outcome aims to create more equitable social norms and related practices. It is measured through two proxy indicators: women’s role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities, and SGBV committed against women. Due to the topic’s sensitive nature and the consortium’s larger focus on women’s participation and leadership, we focused primarily on changes in social norms concerning women’s role in relief, recovery and peacebuilding and less on SGBV.

The MTR collected a wide array of data on social norms related to women’s role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes. The data collected for the MTR tells several different stories. On the one hand, there was consensus amongst focus group participants and almost all key informants that social norms have improved over the past two years and that women now play a much more prominent role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities. However, the quantitative data told a different story, indicating that women’s participation has, in fact, *decreased* in the past two years and that there is increased negativity and criticism against female participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities.

One positive finding within the household survey was a decrease in the number of men who *oppose* women’s participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities compared to the baseline study. While opposition from men has reduced overall, opposition remains stronger in Taiz than in Aden, indicative of more conservative attitudes toward female participation in peacebuilding in this region. Interestingly, men are almost 2.5 times more likely to report that women face opposition or prevention from participating in peacebuilding activities than women. While the precise reason for this gender-based reporting difference remains unclear, it might suggest that men are more aware of

¹⁵ The indicators for which contribution analysis was required were identified and agreed during the mid-term review inception phase.



prevailing attitudes and practices among other men than women. By contrast, the FGDs and vignettes conducted for this study did not indicate significant differences in attitudes between Aden and Taiz.

Regarding norms around SGBV, focus groups held with women reported negative trends for women's safety. Women in Taiz reported that security for women has deteriorated over the past two years, and it is now more unsafe in public spaces. In contrast, women in Aden noted that security for women remains bad (but has not deteriorated). Key informant interviews reiterated that while general security has improved due to the truce and related ceasefire, security for women has, in fact, decreased. Focus groups with men appeared to downplay the risks, with men in Aden suggesting that security for women has improved in both the public and private sphere, in part due to 'women's empowerment' and men in Taiz suggesting that violence against women is not a concern and has not changed in the past two years. These discrepancies appear to indicate the topic's sensitivity and the challenge women likely face when trying to address issues of safety and protection rather than an actual change in social norms around SGBV. Therefore, we have not included any change related to SGBV on this indicator.

On this basis, we have included two signs of change in discriminatory norms in the results framework above, calculated as follows:

1. Perceptions have changed, as expressed in qualitative interviews and focus group discussions. Although quantitative data contradicted this, we see the perceptions of FGD participants and key informants as valid based on their experiences and, therefore, should be included as one sign of change. One reason for the difference is that the survey respondents were randomly chosen, whereas the FGD participants were a mix of those chosen by consortium partners (50%) and randomly chosen (50%), and key informants all had some connection to the consortium's programming (for instance, as consortium members, CSO participants, or powerholders who engaged in training etc.) Therefore, the respondents who participated in FGDs and interviews would have had more exposure to relief, recovery, and peacebuilding, accounting for their more positive views of women's participation.
2. A decrease in the number of men who *oppose* women's participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities was identified in the household survey. As indicated above, FGD participants were more likely to suggest that the community supports women's participation compared to household survey respondents – and this same tendency of FGD participants to be more open to women's participation was also identified in the March 2023 CARE study on social norms. [Note that for the purpose of the results framework, we recognize this sign of change specifically on the basis of the quantitative data, whereas changes identified in the qualitative data are included in the first change above.]

An important methodological point is that the qualitative data mostly involved people who are associated with the programme, whereas the quantitative data came from a randomized community survey. We recognize that different methodologies may result in different findings. This section presents the different data insights and tries to make sense of this complexity. Our ultimate finding is that it appears that some positive change has taken place but that significant attitudinal barriers remain and that communities (particularly in Taiz) have complex and polarised attitudes towards women's involvement in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities. This suggests that progress is fragile and continuing efforts are essential.

There was consensus across focus group participants that social norms have changed in the past two years, and society has become more supportive of women working in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities (at least in Aden and Taiz). Some respondents noted that this support is less likely to extend to peacebuilding due to cultural expectations (namely that peacebuilding work is more likely to involve long phone calls between men and women; that humanitarian work occurs close to home whereas peacebuilding work requires travel to conferences and meetings; and that humanitarian work has a clearer benefit to the community.)



At the same time, respondents felt that women are prevented from participating due to a lack of safety; cultural expectations that women prioritize domestic duties; and social taboos around unrelated women and men spending time together, especially if travel is involved. These factors mirrored those identified during the baseline study. However, one notable change, indicative of a negative trend in social norms, is that during the mid-term review, men and women in Taiz often suggested that an accompanying mahram was necessary to enable women’s participation, particularly if she needs to travel outside her community. This finding was mirrored by at least one key informant who noted that although a *mahram* is not technically required in areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government, the policy introduced by Ansar Allah appears to have given security actors in the South grounds to expect women to travel with a male family member.¹⁶ The factors mitigating resistance to women’s participation are similar now as two years ago and include engaging in activities that “benefit”, “support”, or “develop” the community; a guarantee of safety and safe transport; proximity to home; and access to a salary. The value of a salary appears more important now compared to two years ago. This is not surprising, given the deterioration of Yemen’s economy over the past two years. Beyond this, the vignettes did not identify any clear trends on who had changed their view of social norms.

The quantitative data paints a less positive and more complex picture. Respondents were asked to assess the prevalence of various attitudes within their community using a five-point scale, where one means that the attitude does not exist and five means that the attitude is very prevalent (see table below). Overall, attitudes have regressed in the past two years, with more respondents reporting increased negativity and criticism against female participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities. There were no significant differences between Aden and Taiz; the regression in attitudes was prevalent in both locations. The level of criticism remains comparable for both peacebuilding and relief/recovery, which is a change from the baseline study when female participation in peacebuilding generated more significant criticism from community members.

Table 6. To what degree does this attitude exist in your neighbourhood?

Attitude	Overall baseline	Overall mid-term	Aden baseline	Aden mid-term	Taiz baseline	Taiz midterm
1. It is important for women to participate in the peace process	3.5	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.3
2. Women should not be involved in peacebuilding	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.5
3. There should be more involvement of women in peacebuilding	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.5	3.2
4. It is important for women to participate in relief and recovery efforts	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.5	3.4
5. Women should not be involved in relief and recovery efforts	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.6
6. There should be more involvement of women in relief and recovery efforts	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.5	3.4
7. A woman who participates in peacebuilding activities will be criticised by the community	3.1	2.7	3.0	2.6	3.2	2.9
8. A woman who participates in relief and recovery activities will be	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.8

¹⁶ Key informant interview with MFA and Embassy, interview 1



Attitude	Overall baseline	Overall mid-term	Aden baseline	Aden mid-term	Taiz baseline	Taiz midterm
criticised by the community						

To better understand the perspective of diverse members of the community, the disaggregated data for this question is set out in the table below. There were no strong trends associated with age (rather, this differed by question) and men had marginally more conservative views than women. Women were also more likely than men to acknowledge criticism against women who participate in relief, recovery, or peacebuilding activities.

Table 7. To what degree does this attitude exist in your neighbourhood?

Attitude	Overall	Male	Female	Muhamasheen	PwD	Age < 31	Age > 30 and < 59	Age > 59
1. It is important for women to participate in the peace process	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.3
2. Women should not be involved in peacebuilding	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.1
3. There should be more involvement of women in peacebuilding	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.3
4. It is important for women to participate in relief and recovery efforts	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.3
5. Women should not be involved in relief and recovery efforts	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.3
6. There should be more involvement of women in relief and recovery efforts	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4
7. A woman who participates in peacebuilding activities will be criticised by the community	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.3
8. A woman who participates in relief and	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.7	3.1



Attitude	Overall	Male	Female	Muhamasheen	PwD	Age < 31	Age > 30 and < 59	Age > 59
recovery activities will be criticised by the community								

Given the disparities in educational attainment between the baseline and MTR community survey samples, an analysis of reported attitudes based on educational background was conducted to assess whether these differences could account for the observed decline in social norms. The table below summarizes these findings, and it becomes evident that educational attainment alone does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the decline.

Table 8. To what degree does this attitude exist in your neighbourhood - by educational status

Attitude	Baseline		MTR	
	No education - secondary education	University education	No education - secondary education	University education
1. It is important for women to participate in the peace process	3.4	3.5	3.1	3.4
2. Women should not be involved in peacebuilding	2.1	2.1	2.5	2.5
3. There should be more involvement of women in peacebuilding	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.3
4. It is important for women to participate in relief and recovery efforts	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.4
5. Women should not be involved in relief and recovery efforts	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.3
6. There should be more involvement of women in relief and recovery efforts	3.5	3.4	3.1	3.5
7. A woman who participates in peacebuilding activities will be criticised by the community	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.6
8. A woman who participates in relief and recovery activities will be criticised by the community	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.6

For respondents with no education through secondary education, a deterioration is apparent across almost all attitudes, with the exception of attitude 7. Among respondents with university education, the results are more intricate, showing slight improvements in a few social norms, such as attitude 4, 6, and 7. However, for all other attitudes, either a deterioration (attitudes 1, 2, and 5) or no significant change (attitude 3) is evident.

Therefore, while the disparities in educational attainment between the baseline and MTR samples do affect their comparability, it can be concluded that these differences in educational background do not offer a complete explanation for the overall decline in social norms. Other factors and influences beyond educational attainment are more likely to be responsible for the observed shift in social attitudes.



Contribution Analysis

Contribution analysis was conducted to understand how the consortium contributed to the positive change. The fact that people who are involved with the programme (as staff, beneficiaries, or with some other connection) felt that a change in social norms regarding women’s participation in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding *had* taken place while random community members largely did not, suggests that the programme is having localized impact, but that it is potentially too soon in the programme to see wider change. This also suggests that while there has been a decrease in the number of men opposing women’s participation, the reduction in opposition has not led to an increase in women’s participation, meaning that a change in personal perceptions or attitudes does not lead to change in social norms at community level. Again, this may be a matter of timing, and that it is too early for the reduction in opposition to have led to more participation. Key informants and focus group participants suggested that multiple factors contributed to the positive shift in norms – these same factors likely contributed to the wider perception that opposition by men to women’s participation has decreased. These factors include:

- A rise in the cost of living and high rates of unemployment amongst men has compelled women to join the workforce and provide for their families;
- A significant increase in the number of organizations doing relief, recovery, and (to a lesser extent) peacebuilding activities in Yemen, which means that jobs in the humanitarian and recovery sectors are relatively plentiful;
- Advocacy carried out by multiple organizations showcasing the role of women in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities;
- Seeing that women are fulfilling important roles in the relief, recovery, and peacebuilding sectors; and
- A surge in the use of online platforms and social media to disseminate and consume information (one powerholder called it an ‘electronic revolution’)¹⁷ has increased the visibility of women’s role in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities.

Many of these factors align with the work of the consortium, suggesting that although it is not the only factor to have changed social norms positively, it certainly contributed to the visibility of women working in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding sectors, both online and in real life.

The tools used to collect data for the mid-term review did not explore external factors that may have contributed to the regression in social norms. However, there are several important contextual factors to consider. It is possible that since Yemen failed to renew its truce formally, and the peace process has seen little progress in the past two years (particularly in ways that resonate with the community), people are sceptical of the value of involvement in peacebuilding generally and would not support more involvement of women *or* men. In addition, there is likely a gender-specific aspect to the regression, possibly influenced by the increasingly restrictive policies established by Ansar Allah (such as the *Mahram* rule), which appear to have encouraged shared conservative views amongst actors in southern Yemen. During the implementation period, there was also a significant and very public campaign against NGOs and CSOs, accusing them of violating Yemeni norms and engaging in immoral behaviour. This may have influenced people’s general opinion of women’s involvement in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities – and, equally important for the study, it may have also made it less socially acceptable for respondents to publicly state support for women’s involvement, \even if they hold supportive views at a personal level.

Therefore, this suggests that in order for the programme to affect positive change in future a number of conditions are important. The first is the wider environment. Factors such as insecurity, stigmatization of work with NGOs, and lack of response by the government of such attacks, create significant barriers to social change. On the positive side, networking and collaborating with other NGOs and CSOs appears to be a strengthen of the sector and is able to reinforce positive messages about women’s participation. In addition, online forums appear a valuable avenue to reach people and make visible the work of women even to those who are not witnessing such change in real life.

¹⁷ Key informant interview with powerholder (female), interview 15



S02: Enhanced protection for women

Indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
Number and percentage of women within the Consortium’s network that were able to access information on SGBV services in a safe way, including those who self-report during Consortium service provision activities as survivors of SGBV.	0	450	3,000 70%

Wider issues on enhanced protection for women are addressed in S01 above and So3 below. As noted earlier, focus groups held with women reported negative trends for women’s safety over the past two years.

While not reflected in the indicators for this sub-objective, a number of achievements by the programme contributed to enhanced protection for women. This includes:

- SOS rehabilitated and supported a number of SGBV centres
- Manasati30 prepared a mapping of SGBV services, which was made available to women within the Consortium’s network
- Noted in Domain 3 below, almost one-third of CSOs could identify instances where local authorities contributed to SGBV protection, prevention, and response.
- Noted in Domain 3 below, authorities took some positive steps towards enhancing women’s leadership, such as setting up community committees or village councils and ensuring the involvement of women.

S03: More inclusive relief, recovery, and peace processes

WPS indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
Signs of more women taking up roles as relief/recovery and peacebuilders at local and national levels.	0	2	6
IATI indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
# of governmental policies & strategies blocked, adopted or improved to promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention, peace- and state-building and protect women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations (WGRE 4.1)	0	0	4
# of by-laws blocked, adopted or improved to promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention, peace- and state-building and protect women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations	0	0	6

The quantitative and qualitative data painted a mixed picture regarding the inclusivity of relief, recovery, and peace processes. We identified 2 signs of more women taking up roles in relief, recovery, or peacebuilding, summarised here and then discussed throughout this section:

1. Perceptions have changed, as expressed in qualitative interviews and focus group discussions (although quantitative data contradicted this). Nonetheless, we see the perceptions of FGD participants and key informants as valid given that those who participated in FGDs and interviews are likely more exposed to the relief, recovery, and peacebuilding fields.)
2. Side event in WPS in Yemen at the Yemen International Forum held in The Hague in June 2022

As mentioned in long-term outcome one above, there was consensus amongst focus group participants that women’s involvement in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities has increased over the past two years. Multiple key informants reported the same observation.

However, the quantitative data suggests a decline in women’s participation in peacebuilding and relief activities over the past two years. The data story is complex: respondents were less likely to say that



women ‘frequently’ participate in relief and peacebuilding activities compared to the baseline study. The data reveals higher engagement of women in relief efforts in Taiz compared to Aden, which is consistent with the baseline study.

Respondents were also questioned regarding the frequency with which women are prevented or denied the opportunity to engage in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities. Compared to the baseline study, a marginal negative trend is observed concerning peacebuilding activities, whereas a very modest positive trend is noted for relief/recovery activities. Respondents in Taiz were much more likely to report that women are prevented or not given the opportunity to participate, which is interesting given that respondents from Taiz also report a higher frequency of female involvement in relief/recovery efforts. These findings suggest a polarised perception of female participation in Taiz, encompassing elevated participation rates and heightened opposition.

One key informant recalled that at the Yemen International Forum held in The Hague in June 2022, there was a side event on women, peace, and security in Yemen. There was a tangible increase (noted by multiple participants in the Forum) in the level of attention and focus on gender and women’s issues within the programme of the Yemen International Forum. This suggested that more inclusive discussions were becoming possible. Additionally, the presence of a government representative on the panel on women, peace, and security marked a positive step forward in recognizing the importance of the WPS agenda.¹⁸ While there were shortcomings to the way that women were included and recognized at this event – in particular, it was a very donor-driven event rather than an event driven by Yemeni women or authorities – given the highly restrictive environment in Yemen, the fact that this event was held and women’s role as peacebuilders was recognized is a sign of change worth recognizing.

One reason that less progress than hoped has been made on this indicator is that a significant campaign was launched against women in public spaces and against women working for local NGOs in 2022. The campaign sought to associate women active in public spaces and women engaged in community-level work with negative stereotypes and, more directly, with accusations of engaging in activities such as prostitution. Given the country’s conservative and traditional social context, this was a deeply sensitive issue in Yemen. The allegations meant that people started to avoid any kind of identification with an NGO, and families would prevent their daughters from attending training or other activities held by NGOs due to the stigma. This suggests that stigmatization is a key barrier to women’s participation and change will be difficult

Contribution Analysis: Signs of more women taking up roles

Contribution analysis was conducted to understand how the consortium contributed to the positive change in terms of women taking up roles in relief, recovery and peacebuilding. There is overlap here with Sub-Objective 1 that examined the social norms shaping women’s participation, and then this sub-objective considered women’s actual participation. As noted earlier, people who are involved with the programme in some way felt that women do participate more often, most likely because they have observed women firsthand in these roles, whereas it appears that random community members have not experienced the same visibility of women. One reason for this may be the deterioration in security for women in public spaces, as noted in sub-objective 1. Women may intentionally take lower profiles roles that may not be visible to the community, but are visible to those involved in relief and recovery programming. This suggests that one condition that needs to exist for the community to become aware of women’s participation is greater security for women in public space.

The factors identified as contributing to the change in social norms also contributed to women’s participation in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding roles, namely: deterioration of the economy, pushing more women into the workforce; a significant increase in the number of organizations working in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding; collective advocacy by these organizations; and the use of online platforms to increase visibility of women’s achievements. As noted earlier, many of these

¹⁸ Key informant interview with MFA and Embassy, interview 1



factors align with the work of the consortium and indicate that the programme has contributed to the increase in participation by women.

As noted above, a change in men’s opposition to women’s participation did not result in more women participating in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities, meaning that a change in social norms does not automatically result in a change in behaviour. It would be interesting for the consortium to explore why this is – is it that women remain wary of the opposition and stigmatization that has existed in the past? In which case, how could the consortium overcome this if social norms are in fact changing?

4.2 INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES

The programme also identified four intermediate outcomes, known as ‘Domains of Change.’ This section discusses the progress made towards these intermediate outcomes. It aims to answer the following questions:

- Which programme interventions have shown notable effectiveness in producing the anticipated intermediate outcomes and are likely to contribute to the overall programme outcomes?
- Conversely, which interventions have been less effective, and how can they be improved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or nonachievement of the objectives?
- Have there been any unintended positive or negative outcomes?

There is an overlap between the long-term outcomes (above) and the intermediate outcomes. For the sake of brevity, we do not repeat all the findings in both sections but encourage that the report is read holistically, given the interconnectedness between (and within) the long-term and intermediate outcomes. The MTR did not identify any unintended positive or negative outcomes, the existing framework appeared to identify the relevant outcomes.

Domain 1: Civil Society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action

Indicator	Baseline	MTR	Target
Number and percentage of CSOs that actively consult and include women in the formulation and implementation of advocacy initiatives	0	16 (83%)	44
Number of advocacy initiatives carried out targeting authorities and humanitarian actors to improve the prevention of and response to SGBV	0	42	45
Number of advocacy initiatives carried out targeting male family and community members to change discriminatory social norms and related practices	0	29	45
Number of advocacy initiatives carried out targeting formal and informal powerholders to increase women’s participation in relief, recovery and peace processes	0	38	45
IATI MTR indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
# of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on women’s voice, agency, leadership and representative participation in decision-making processes in public, private and civic sphere, through agenda setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building	0	42 ¹⁹	72

¹⁹ The consortium links this IATI indicator with WPS indicator: “Number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels”.




# of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention and peace- and state-building and protecting women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations, through agenda setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building	0	7 ²⁰	49
# of advocacy initiatives carried out by CSOs, for, by or with their membership/constituency	0	109 ²¹	135

Domain 1 aims to understand the Consortium’s interventions’ impact on the competency, nature, and activities of civil society actors. This section starts by reviewing the key findings for each indicator from the CSO survey and interviews with CSOs and consortium members. Due to the large amount of data collected during the MTR, we have included a detailed summary of the findings from the CSO survey in Annex 3. In addition, an analysis of adjustments that should be made during phase 2 of the programme is located in the section on Theory of Change. In contrast, this section focuses on the findings related to this Domain.

A total of 28 CSOs were asked if they actively consult and include women in the formulation and implementation of advocacy initiatives. Of the 28 CSOs, only 18 were involved in advocacy, and of these 18, only 15 included the community in the design of their advocacy activities. Of those 15 CSOs, three included women to a large extent, nine to some extent, and three a little. We interpret this to mean that 83% of CSOs involved in advocacy included women in the formulation of advocacy initiatives (i.e. 15 of 18).²² In addition, of the 18 CSOs involved in advocacy, 16 included the community in implementing their advocacy activities. Of these 16 CSOs, four include women to a large extent, 11 to some extent, and one a little. We interpret this to mean that 89% of CSOs involved in advocacy included women in the formulation of advocacy initiatives (i.e. 16 of 18).²³ Therefore, we have included 16 and 89% in the results framework.

Figure 1. Did you involve the community in the design of advocacy messages and activities?²⁴



²⁰ This is the sum of two WPS indicators that the consortium links to this IATI indicator: “Number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels” which achieved a figure of 7; and “Number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen’s NAP 1325” which achieved a figure of 1, being the Hague conference.

²¹ The consortium links this IATI indicator to the 3 WPS indicators above on advocacy initiatives.


²² Although if the full cohort of 28 CSOs is included, the percentage falls to 58% or 15 out of 26.

²³ Although if the full cohort of 28 CSOs is included, the percentage falls to 62% or 16 out of 26.

²⁴ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 13%
Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 20%, yes, to some extent: 40%, yes, a little: 20%, no: 20%



Figure 2. Did this include women?²⁵



While only 64% of CSOs interviewed for the MTR carried out advocacy activities, the total number of advocacy activities was relatively high. We aimed to capture a wide range of campaigns, utilizing a definition proposed by the IATI Strengthening Civil Society indicator guidelines that understood ‘advocacy initiative’ as any activity that involves activities such as organizing a public campaign, writing a policy brief, and submitting it to the concerned authority, commissioning research to generate the evidence base, initiating influencing processes, or related activities. We calculated the figures for advocacy initiatives after a review of consortium annual reports, as well as the CSO survey. There are some limitations to both methods, which can be rectified with the annual report for 2023. The CSO survey does not include all CSOs involved in the programme but only the 28 interviewed for the MTR. Therefore, the actual figure should be higher. However, a review of the annual reports for 2021 and 2022 found that the number of advocacy initiatives reported were *lower* than the CSO study, presumably because they don’t capture the many activities that took place in 2023. We have used the figures from the CSO survey to avoid duplication. These are:

- Each CSOs implemented an average of 2.5 advocacy initiatives **targeting authorities and humanitarian actors to improve the prevention of and response to SGBV**, amounting to a total of 37 advocacy initiatives. In comparison, MOs implemented an average of 1.7 initiatives, totalling five advocacy initiatives. Therefore, the total number reported is 42. Note that there were significant differences – some CSOs implemented zero advocacy initiatives, while others implemented more than 5.
- On average, CSOs conducted 1.5 advocacy initiatives **targeting male family and community members to change discriminatory social norms and related practices**, totalling 23 initiatives. In contrast, MOs conducted an average of two, resulting in six advocacy initiatives. Therefore, the total number reported is 29.
- On average, CSOs implemented 2.3 initiatives **targeting formal and informal powerholders to increase women’s participation in relief, recovery and peace processes**, with a total of 35 initiatives. In contrast, MOs conducted an average of one initiative, resulting in a total of three initiatives. Therefore, the total number reported is 38.

The consortium has provided capacity-building to a large number of CSOs – 85 according to the consolidated Annual Report for 2022, although this figure may have increased in 2023.²⁶ CSOs were asked to self-assess various aspects of their organisation’s advocacy capacity.²⁷ Overall, there was a

²⁵ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 29%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 75%, yes, a little: 13%, no: 0%

²⁶ We have focused here on the impact of capacity-building rather than the precise number, and defer to CARE Netherlands on behalf of the consortium to update the figures related to capacity-building, if required. A change in figures will not change the analysis in this evaluation.

²⁷ My organisation has a management team that is dedicated to advocacy (face-to-face: 3, online: 2.6), my organization has strategic leadership on advocacy (face-to-face: 3.1, online: 2.8), my organization maintains an internal governance structure that supports advocacy work (face-to-face: 2.6, online: 2.9), my organization maintains effective communication within the organization about advocacy (face-to-face: 3.3, online: 3.3), my organization has dedicated sound financial management to support advocacy (face-to-face: 2.6 online: 2.6), my organization has



slight decline compared to the baseline study. However, when the analysis is done only for those 5 CSOs/MOs included in both the baseline and the MTR, the trend becomes more complex with an improvement reported in certain areas while a decline is visible in other areas.

Table 7. Score your organisation for the following on a scale from one to five

	CSOs baseline	CSOs mid-term	MOs baseline	MOs mid-term	Baseline (same) ²⁸	MTR (same) ²⁹
My organisation has a management team that is dedicated to advocacy	2.9	2.6	2.4	3.5	3.2	3.2
My organisation has strategic leadership in advocacy	2.8	2.7	3.3	4.3	3.6	3.2
My organisation maintains an internal governance structure that supports advocacy work	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.0	2.8
My organisation maintains effective communication within the organisation about advocacy	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.6
My organisation has dedicated sound financial management to support advocacy	3.0	2.5	2.9	3	3.4	2.2
My organisation has dedicated sufficient human resources to advocacy so that it can achieve the advocacy objectives	2.7	2.4	2.7	3.8	2.6	3.0
My organisation has sufficient facilities and technology available to support advocacy work, including an advocacy database	3.0	2.2	2.4	2.8	3.4	2.6
My organisation has sufficient inter-organisational linkages	2.7	3.3	2.1	3.3	3.2	4.0


dedicated sufficient human resources to advocacy, so that it can achieve the advocacy objectives (face-to-face: 2.5 online: 2.7), my organization has sufficient facilities and technology available to support advocacy work, including a database for storing and analyzing collected advocacy data (face-to-face: 2.4 online: 2.2), and my organization has Sufficient inter-organizational linkages (face-to-face: 3.3 online: 3.1)

²⁸ Those five CSOs/Mos that were also included in the MTR

²⁹ Those five CSOs/Mos that were also included in the baseline



Figure 20. Does your organisation have an advocacy strategy for at least six months?



While the overall percentage of CSOs who have a strategic plan remains low, small progress has been made when comparing the data for the five CSOs both included in the baseline and MTR. Moreover, for those with an advocacy strategy, almost no organizations reported that the strategy was well known throughout the organisation. A direct comparison of the five CSOs included in the baseline³⁰ and MTR³¹ reveals a decline in the degree to which the advocacy strategy is known throughout the organisation. CSOs without an advocacy strategy reported similar challenges to those reported during the baseline study. These included lack of funding; lack of expertise; and lack of clarity around advocacy goals. This suggests that training alone is insufficient to build advocacy capacity but would benefit from ongoing mentorship and support.

Despite the dip in overall scores for CSOs, a substantial rise was observed in scores for inter-organisational linkages. This increase was also visible when only comparing the five CSOs/MOs included in both the baseline and MTR. This points to the valuable work of the consortium in connecting CSOs to each other and to larger organizations as part of the capacity-building efforts. Roughly two-thirds of CSOs engage in formal and informal networks to advance advocacy efforts,³² similar to the baseline study.³³ When limiting the analysis only to those 5 CSOs/MOs included in the baseline³⁴ and MTR,³⁵ however, an increase is observed. Interviews with a select number of CSOs reinforced the importance and value of networking, and multiple CSOs used networking and forming partnerships with other organizations as a key part of their advocacy campaign. In addition, all CSOs/MOs report being able to mobilise a network of people in support of their advocacy efforts (with little change from the baseline study.)

³⁰ Yes, to a large degree: 50%; yes, to some extent: 50%

³¹ Yes, to some extent: 67%; no, only with management: 33%

³² Face-to-face surveys – yes: 67%, no: 25%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes: 50%, no: 43%, I don't know: 7%


³³ Respondents who responded affirmatively to the previous question were also asked to specify the networks or informal collaborations they are part of. Various networks were cited, including the Civil Coalition for Peace, Himmat Women for Development, Sanad Network, Sunbula Network, National Network for Community and Youth Initiatives, AMAN Bloc, Youth Peace and Security Pact, Youth Support Group, Yemeni Cultural Network, Peace and Development Bloc, Civil Voices Caucus, Youth Peace Forum, WILF Network, Yemen Group, Community Cooperation Network, Peace Companies Network, UN Gender Network, and the Innovation and Advocacy Network.

³⁴ Yes: 60%; no: 40%

³⁵ Yes: 100%; no: 0%



Figure 25. Does your organisation have strong relationships with ...?



CSOs and MOs were also interviewed regarding their relationships with formal and informal powerholders³⁶ and media actors³⁷. CSOs/MOs maintain relatively similar levels of rapport with both powerholders and media representatives. However, a notable decline is visible when contrasting the baseline data with the findings from the MTR, indicating a weakening of relationships with both categories of actors. When analysing the data only from the five CSOs included in both the baseline and MTR, a decrease in relationships with authorities is observed. For the relationships with media representatives, on the other hand, a slight increase is visible between the baseline³⁸ and MTR³⁹, even though a decrease is visible for one CSO.

There was also a decline in safe spaces for community members among CSOs/MOs, both when comparing the data of the entire sample⁴⁰ and when limiting the analysis only to CSOs included in the baseline and MTR.

There were reduced concerns regarding implementing advocacy activities due to potential security risks⁴¹ or negative impacts on their relationships with authorities⁴² or the community⁴³. However, a notable proportion of CSOs still expressed substantial concerns regarding potential security risks associated with the execution of advocacy initiatives. There was also minimal concern about the detrimental effects of their initiatives on (female) beneficiaries⁴⁴ and their staff⁴⁵.

³⁶ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 33%, yes, to some extent: 42%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 17%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 21%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 21%, no: 7%

³⁷ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 33%, yes, to some extent: 42%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 14%, yes, to some extent: 57%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%

³⁸ No: 0%; yes, a little: 0%; yes, to some extent: 80%; yes, to a large extent: 20%

³⁹ No: 0%; yes, a little: 20%; yes, to some extent: 20%; yes, to a large extent: 60%

⁴⁰ The CSOs/MOs were also questioned about safe spaces where community members can gather and contribute to advocacy initiatives.

Face-to-face surveys – yes: 33%, no: 58%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes: 64%, no: 36%, I don't know: 0%

⁴¹ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 8%, yes, to some extent: 17%, yes, a little: 33%, no: 42%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 7%, yes, to some extent: 36%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 29%

⁴² Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 8%, yes, a little: 17%, no: 75%, I don't know: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 21%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 43%, I don't know: 7%

⁴³ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 8%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 7%, yes, a little: 14%, no: 64%, I don't know: 14%


⁴⁴ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 8%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 7%, no: 83%, I don't know: 0%

⁴⁵ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 17%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 21%, no: 71%, I don't know: 7%

Figure 28. Does your organisation currently have a safe space where community members can meet and join advocacy activities?



Most CSOs/MOs confirmed the community’s involvement in the design of advocacy messages and activities.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, analysing data from both the baseline and MTR exposes a decline in the degree to which CSOs involve the community in developing advocacy messages and initiatives, both when analysing the entire sample and only the five CSOs/MOs included in both the baseline and MTR. Most CSOs and MOs confirmed the involvement of both women⁴⁷ and youth⁴⁸ in designing their advocacy messages and activities. However, it is worth noting that the extent to which organisations include women has decreased since the baseline, both when analysing the entire samples and only the data from the five CSOs/MOs included in both the baseline and MTR.⁴⁹ Similarly, a decline is evident both when analysing the complete samples and only those CSOs/MOs included in both the baseline and MTR in the extent to which organisations integrate the community in the execution of advocacy initiatives.⁵⁰ It should be noted here, however, that the observed declines may also be (partly) attributed to CSOs/MOs’ more critical perception on what constitutes including community members in the design and executing of advocacy.

CSOs and MOs struggled to describe how they influenced political agenda-setting and debates. While CSOs were convinced they had influenced political agenda-setting and political debates, most could not specify how they did this or the impact they had. A few CSOs mentioned providing training to authorities, and one CSO reported publishing reports on women’s rights.

Most CSOs (73%) and MOs (50%) had received training in organizational management.⁵¹ CSOs highly regarded this training. The top reported impact was improvements in their skills related to proposal writing. Suggestions by CSOs to improve the training included:

- One CSO in Taiz noted that the training took place online, which undermined its effectiveness (note: this may have been due to COVID restrictions or security considerations, the CSO did not specify)⁵²
- Any training on WPS should be more tailored to the Yemeni context⁵³

⁴⁶ The question asked about the inclusion of the community in the formulation of advocacy messages and initiatives.

Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 13%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 20%, yes, to some extent: 40%, yes, a little: 20%, no: 20%

⁴⁷ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 29%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 75%, yes, a little: 13%, no: 0%

⁴⁸ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 14%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 43%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 25%, yes, to some extent: 63%, yes, a little: 13%, no: 0%

⁴⁹ Youth involvement was not measured during the baseline survey.

⁵⁰ Respondents were questioned about the community’s involvement when implementing advocacy activities.

Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 13%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 30%, yes, to some extent: 40%, yes, a little: 20%, no: 10%

⁵¹ Covering project proposal writing, logical framework, work plan, budgeting, and Monitoring and Evaluation within the framework of the WPS3 programme.

⁵² Key informant interview with CSO in Taiz, Interview 9

⁵³ Key informant interview with CSO in Aden, interview 10



- Add sessions on strategic planning and advocacy (the training this CSO attended was on organizational management)⁵⁴
- Add sessions on fundraising, as well as proposal writing and “marketing” proposals to gain funding support⁵⁵
- How to involve disabled women in decision-making and integrate them into peace-building projects
- Integrate gender into each training session
- Ensure an appropriate location to hold the training (no specific details were provided, but we understand this refers to the training venue)

Roughly one-third of the surveyed CSOs received a seed grant as part of the WPS programme.⁵⁶ According to the recipients, the seed grants increased awareness about the role of women in peacebuilding as well as general awareness about SGBV. Two CSOs reported that their initiative led to appointing women in government positions, and one CSO reported that the initiative increased women’s participation in peacebuilding. One CSO used their seed grant to form women’s mediation committees and reported, *“We have resolved six social issues, which in turn contributes to building societal peace.”*⁵⁷

Contribution Analysis: CSOs succeed in creating space

As noted above, the IATI indicators that relate to CSOs succeeding in creating space for CSO demands are linked to two WPS indicators: (1) men and (influential) community members acting as allies, and (2) actors outside Yemen promoting the NAP. Therefore, we conducted contribution analysis on the WPS indicators to understand the contribution the programme made to these changes.

On the first indicator – community members acting as allies – the programme has made significant efforts in working with men both online and offline to encourage them to act as allies and role models. Data from Manasati30 shows that their engagement with men on their online platforms has had a significant impact. Therefore it seems that the programme’s contribution to men acting as allies is relatively high when it relates to men who have been engaged in the programme activities, such as training, advocacy campaigns, or the Manasati30 online platform. However, it is less clear the extent to which the programme has encouraged men who have no direct association with the program to act as allies.

A likely barrier preventing men who are not directly connected with the programme from acting as allies is the recent campaign against women’s involvement in NGOs, which heavily stigmatized women’s participation in relief and recovery work. If this stigma was reduced (through a change in social norms, for instance, or efforts by the government to address such targeted attacks) it is likely that more men would be willing to speak up as allies.

On the second indicator – cases where actors outside Yemen promote the NAP – the achievement recognized by the mid-term review was the inclusion of a side event on women, peace and security at the Yemen International Forum at the Hague. There was reportedly a tangible shift in the attention given this issue by Yemeni representatives – for example, last year some representatives left a similar discussion, whereas this year there was a much higher level of intentional engagement on issues related to gender, not only at the side event but throughout the Forum. It appeared that more inclusive discussions were becoming possible, including with authorities, indicated by the attendance or a government representative on the panel.

⁵⁴ Key informant interview with CSO in Taiz, interview 11

⁵⁵ Key informant interview with CSO in Taiz, interview 13. This was also suggested by one of the trainers who is a female powerholder Aden, interview 18.

⁵⁶ A total of 8 CSOs, or 36% of the total number of surveyed CSOs (22). No MOs interviewed for the study received a seed grant.

⁵⁷ Key informant interview with CSO in Aden, Interview 12



While the programme cannot claim sole responsibility for this change, it appears that the issue of women’s inclusion is both more visible and more acceptable to talk about, and this change is likely due to the same issues highlighted earlier: growth in the number of NGOs and CSOs working on WPS programming and putting pressure on the government to consider women’s inclusion; collective advocacy and awareness-raising that has brought attention to this issue in the public space (such as traditional and social media). The consortium appears to have played an important role in generating visibility of the issue, which also raised the pressure on authorities to address women’s participation.

In order for additional external actors promote the NAP, there will need to be continued advocacy and visibility of the issue, particularly in an international forum. This report makes some recommendations on ‘going beyond the local’ and strengthening this component of the programme.

Contribution Analysis: Advocacy initiatives carried out by CSOs, for, by or with their constituency

This indicator is measured by the number of initiatives conducted by CSOs, but does not trace the impact of each initiative. CSOs carried out a high number of advocacy initiatives – 109 attributed to this indicator – and it was beyond the scope of the mid-term evaluation to measure the impact of each initiative. The advocacy conducted by CSOs involved in the programme has contributed to the visibility of women’s participation, and this was a key factor identified in focus group discussions as prompting a change in social norms. As such, it is likely that the CSOs contributed to the positive shift in social norms perceived by people associated with the programme. There were also numerous concrete reports of action in support of the women, peace, and security agenda as the result of CSO advocacy, such as the appointment of women to different leadership positions. However, we found that most CSOs stated that their advocacy had social impact, but could not answer how it had that impact or why its advocacy resulted in social change.

A further limitation for contribution analysis on this indicator is that most CSOs do not have clear constituencies, but generally operate on a project-by-project basis, linked to funding. Therefore it is not clear how they have contributed to a change *for* their constituency. As discussed earlier, in order for this to happen in future, it will be necessary for the CSOs to mature as civil society actors, and this would benefit from more intensive mentorship by consortium members.

Domain 2: Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women’s positive contributions and leadership

Indicator	Baseline	MTR	Target
Number of men and (influential) community members capacitated to advance women’s rights and gender equality	0	306	335
Number of men and (influential) community members that are more aware of women’s positive contribution and leadership	0	Revise methodology 75%	1,500
Number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels	0	42	72
Number and percentage of male family and (influential) community members that believe relief, recovery and peace processes should be more inclusive of women	0	85%	375 of 500 (75%)

Domain 2 aims to shift social norms and create a more positive environment for women to lead and participate in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities. As such, it is closely related to long-term outcome 1 (change in social norms). Domain 2 focuses on a specific component in that shift in norms: the attitudes of men towards women who participate in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities.



On the number of men and (influential) community members more aware of women's positive contribution and leadership, we used the household survey to gauge the level of men's awareness. Male respondents agreed (strongly or somewhat strongly) with the following statements:

- Women can be equally good leaders as men: 67% (n=40)
- Women play an equally important role as men in ensuring long-lasting peace: 75% (n=45)
- Women play an equally important role as men in shaping the future of Yemen: 78%(n=47)

There are some methodological challenges with this indicator and its target. Suppose we rely on a randomised household survey to calculate progress. In that case, we are limited by the sample size, and it is not easy to foresee a connection to the current target of 1,500 individuals. Equally, the number of individuals trained is unlikely to reach 1,500. If we consider the reach of advocacy campaigns that aim to increase men's awareness of women's positive contributions, the reach is well beyond 1,500. Therefore, we suggest revising this target and clarifying the methodology. One option is to replace the number with a percentage calculated based on a clear methodology. As an example, we have suggested using the percentage of men who agreed with the statement 'women play an equally important role as men in ensuring long-lasting peace' since it most closely aligns with the goal of the indicator. Therefore, the result is 75%.

On the number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches, and other channels, we used the household survey to calculate the number of cases. The results were as follows:

- Male respondents report speaking out themselves: 25% (n=15)
- Respondents (male and female) observed male community members speaking out: 18% (n=27)
- Respondents (male and female) authority speaking out: 5% (n=7)

Therefore, the total is marked as 49 cases, the sum of the above three categories.

On the number and percentage of male family and (influential) community members that believe relief, recovery, and peace processes should be more inclusive of women, we used the household survey to calculate the number and percentage. We used the responses from male respondents only, assuming they would more accurately reflect the perceptions of other males. Male respondents stated that the following beliefs exist in their community to a great extent or some extent:

- There should be more involvement of women in peacebuilding: 85% (n=51)
- There should be more involvement of women in relief and recovery efforts 85% (n=51)

Therefore, the results framework reads 44 persons and 85%. We suggest that the consortium remove the numerical measurement (i.e. 375 of 500) and retain only the percentage (with a minimum sample size of 50).


Generally, in terms of men's support for women's participation, the household survey found a modest increase in male support for women's engagement in peacebuilding activities compared to the baseline study. However, no clear trend existed regarding men's support for women's participation in relief and recovery activities. Conversely, a clear decrease was reported in men's opposition to women's participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities compared to the baseline. This trend suggests that, although active support from men may not have visibly increased, there has been a visible decline in active opposition towards women participating in such activities.

Support for women's participation in all activities was similar in both Taiz and Aden. However, respondents in Taiz tended to select the extreme answer options (i.e., frequently and rarely) more often, indicating more polarised views. Men's opposition to women's participation was significantly higher in Taiz than in Aden, indicating more conservative attitudes toward female participation.



Women were less likely than men to report both support and opposition. This was particularly pronounced in reports of opposition: male respondents were almost 2.5 times more likely to report that women face opposition in peacebuilding activities than female respondents. While the precise reason for this gender-based reporting difference is unclear, it might suggest that men are more aware of prevailing attitudes and practices among other men than women. This could be a direct result of the situation that men and women generally only mix with other genders within their own family context, and not beyond that. Respondents with disabilities reported elevated levels of support and average levels of opposition. In contrast, Muhamasheen respondents report very low support and high opposition. This suggests that female Muhamasheen receive the least support and encounter the most opposition when engaging in relief and recovery activities.

Figure 3. Men support/oppose women to participate in...




To understand whether the differences in educational backgrounds between the respondents in the baseline sample and the MTR sample can account for the observed trends, we conducted an analysis of the results stratified by educational status. The figures on the following page illustrate that educational status indeed exerts a discernible influence on respondents' answers but cannot explain the observed trends. More specifically, while educational background is an influential factor, other factors and variables are also contributing to the observed trends.

Regarding the support given by men to women's participation in peacebuilding, respondents with university education reported an increase in support during the MTR when compared to the baseline. In contrast, among those with no education, no clear trend emerged, as MTR respondents were equally likely to report frequent support from men as well as no (or rare) support from men.

When it comes to relief and recovery, respondents with no, primary, or secondary education consistently reported a decrease in support from men when comparing baseline and MTR data. However, among university-educated respondents, no clear trend was evident, as they were equally likely to report frequent and no (or rare) support from men during the baseline and the MTR.




Figure 4. Men support women to participate in... - by educational status.



Regarding opposition from men to women's participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities, a consistent trend emerges. There is a clear decline in opposition from men across both levels of educational status when comparing the baseline and MTR data. In other words, regardless of whether respondents have low (no, primary, or secondary) or high (university) educational attainment, the results show a reduction in opposition from men to women's involvement in these activities over time.



Figure 5. Men oppose women to participate in... - by educational status.



The household survey also sought to understand the extent to which men actively support women’s participation. It asked whether the respondent had spoken out on social media or in public against discriminatory gender norms in the past 12 months, if they had observed an influential (male) community member do so, and whether they observed an authority do so.

Over 15% of surveyed community members reported that they personally had spoken out against discriminatory gender norms in the past year. Respondents in Taiz were over five times more likely to have done this than respondents in Aden. This underscores the polarization of views in Taiz, with high levels of opposition (see above) and high levels of support towards women’s participation. Men were more likely than women to report that they had spoken out against discriminatory gender norms. Conversely, individuals identified as persons with disabilities and Muhamasheen were less likely to speak out. The main messages delivered included messages favouring women’s employment and messages more general in favour of gender equality. Most people use Facebook, WhatsApp, and public spaces to speak out against discriminatory gender norms. Persons with disabilities relied solely on social media to speak out (probably due partly to mobility issues). In contrast, Muhamasheen only used public engagement (probably due to a lack of access to the internet or social media platforms).

Roughly 10% of respondents had observed an influential community member speaking out against harmful gender norms. This was more common in Taiz than in Aden, and men were more likely to witness this than women. Most people witnessed this on Facebook or in a WhatsApp group. Messages revolved around gender equality in general, women’s rights, and the role of women in society. A few respondents also specifically mentioned women’s employment as well as women’s involvement in peacebuilding. Another positive sign of change is that several programmes, media platforms and websites run by men advocate for gender equality and export women’s success stories.⁵⁸

According to programme documents, in 2022, the programme intended to analyse the specific interests of men (as heads of households and as community leaders) that compel them to support women’s participation and then target these interests to incentivize men’s support and choose tactics

⁵⁸ Key informant interview with powerholder (female) in Taiz, interview 17



for engagement (such as framing men as role models or strategic allies). It is unclear if this took place in 2022 (or is underway) but this line of action should be strengthened in 2023. It is clear from the data that perspectives on women’s participation are very different in Taiz and Aden, and advocacy strategies will need to take a different approach in each city to change the perspective of men there effectively.

Data on the online advocacy activities by Manasati30 indicates its positive impact. In 2022, an average of 73% of respondents who had engaged with in a Manasati30 platform reported an increase in knowledge to a “large” extent, while 67% of respondents admitted a behavioural change related to the topics discussed on the Manasati30 website. Some respondents also gave examples of behavioural change due to engaging in the Manasati platform.⁵⁹

Domain 3: Formal and informal powerholders are more supportive and responsive to women

Indicator	Baseline	MTR	Target
Number of cases where formal and informal powerholders act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels	0	7	72
Number of instances where ministries and humanitarian actors associated in some way with the Consortium implement at national level established guidelines and best practices to address gaps and challenges in the prevention of and response to SGBV	0	0	6
Number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen’s NAP 1325	0	1	9
Number of cases where local authorities contribute to methods of protection, prevention of and response to SGBV	0	0	18
Signs of change showing that Yemen’s NAP 1325 is further developed by the International Recognised Government (IRG) and implemented by relevant ministries and local authorities	0	0	9

Domain 3 focuses on the capacities, attitudes and behaviours of powerholders. While the Yemeni context is both complex and challenging, there were indications of positive change brought about in part by the programme.

One way the MTR aimed to identify and quantify changes in social norms was by asking CSOs about their experiences. CSOs reported an equal mix of supportive and unsupportive behaviour from local authorities towards SGBV programming.⁶⁰ Most CSOs reported that there was no change in the level of support over two years, although some reported a slight increase in support.⁶¹ Even a small change is notable given the consortium is working on issues related to women’s leadership and participation as well as SGBV, all of which are sensitive issues in the Yemen context. The CSO survey uncovered only one instance where an authority figure spoke out against discriminatory gender norms in the past year.⁶²

⁵⁹ Manasati30, Annual Report Year 2 (2022).

⁶⁰ Face-to-face surveys – very supportive: 8%, somewhat supportive: 25%, neither supportive nor unsupportive: 17%, somewhat unsupportive: 33%, very unsupportive: 17%, I don’t know: 0%

Online surveys – very supportive: 0%, somewhat supportive: 43%, neither supportive nor unsupportive: 14%, somewhat unsupportive: 7%, very unsupportive: 14%, I don’t know: 21%

⁶¹ Face-to-face surveys – became a lot more supportive: 0%, became somewhat more supportive: 25%, no change: 50%, became somewhat less supportive: 8%, became a lot less supportive 17%, I don’t know: 0%

Online surveys – became a lot more supportive: 7%, became somewhat more supportive: 29%, no change: 29%, became somewhat less supportive: 7%, became a lot less supportive 0%, I don’t know: 29%

⁶² This isolated case involved a party leader expressing support for women’s moral and financial backing, communicated through a television platform.



There were several positive steps towards enhancing women's leadership. Local authorities set up community committees or village councils and increased the participation of women in these committees. Therefore, they could participate when the local authorities prepared their annual district plans. This contributed to changing the stereotypical image of women's participation, as well as what constitutes women's 'work.' The Internationally Recognized Government appointed female judges to the Supreme Judicial Council, as well as five women as Deputy Directors of police departments in Taiz city. While the latter indicated a positive change, it also showcased the polarised views that coexist in Taiz. After the appointments, some religious figures advocated against this decision, causing the police department to revoke the women's positions and reinstate them as 'Women and Child Directors,' a far weaker and more marginalised position. This demonstrates the risk of taking action that does not have sufficient social backing or faces opposition. From now on, the consortium should consider how it can strengthen and support such decisions to reduce the risk of overturning these positive developments.

The work of the consortium does appear to have influenced the positive change in attitudes and behaviours of (male) powerholders. The consortium carried out a range of training on SGBV with local authorities and powerholders who have a mandate or responsibility to address SGBV, including both men and women. The training appears to have had an impact beyond increasing the knowledge and capacities of male powerholders. One CSO in Taiz noted that during their advocacy campaign, they *"coordinated and networked with decision-makers ... and one outcome was that a coordination memorandum was developed for organizations providing protection services in Salah district...It was [the authorities] who proposed [the Memorandum] to enhance the response to the protection of women and girls...while also promoting coordination between service providers from government offices and civil society."*⁶³

In addition, Manasati30 and CSOs carried out different advocacy campaigns targeting local authorities and powerholders as well as influential people in the community. One CSO in Taiz noted that: "our efforts resulted in appointing several women as deputy directors of government offices and pledging to the leaders and community leaders to include women in neighbourhood committees."⁶⁴

Other factors likely also contributed to the shift in the attitudes and behaviours of powerholders. This included:

- Private sector activities that engage women, such as small projects and entrepreneurship, demonstrate women's ability to take on professional responsibilities.⁶⁵
- Visibility of women in leadership and professional roles due to the growth in the number of CSOs, NGOs, and international humanitarian and recovery actors present in the country – including the consortium members.
- More broadly, advocacy by NGOs and civil society has put pressure on authorities to include women in leadership positions and decision-making.⁶⁶
- Support of 'ordinary' men or of powerholders for women's participation and inclusion in leadership. For example, one female powerholder in Taiz noted that the people who make up the Culture Office in Taiz are media figures, political actors, and human rights activists who are all committed to strengthening the role of women and the visibility of women in leadership, through publications, social media, or by holding seminars and events.⁶⁷

CSOs were questioned about instances in the past two years during which local authorities contributed to SGBV protection, prevention, and response.⁶⁸ Almost one-third of CSOs could identify

⁶³ Key informant interview with CSO in Taiz, interview 9, Key informant interview with powerholder (female) who also conducted the training, interview 15

⁶⁴ Key informant interview with CSO in Taiz, interview 11

⁶⁵ Key informant interview with powerholder (female), interview 15

⁶⁶ Key informant interview with powerholder (female) in Taiz, interview 16

⁶⁷ Key informant interview with powerholder (female) in Taiz, interview 16

⁶⁸ Face-to-face surveys – yes, more than once: 0%, yes, once: 8%, no, never: 33%, I don't know: 58%
Online surveys – yes, more than once: 21%, yes, once: 14%, no, never: 0%, I don't know: 64%



such an instance and reported various scenarios, including the apprehension and prosecution of SGBV perpetrators. Another respondent indicated that authorities demonstrated their commitment by endorsing SGBV programming. Additionally, it was highlighted that in Taiz, security authorities closely collaborated with a CSO to address cyber blackmail cases against women. Two respondents conveyed that authorities exhibited increased support for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) offering psychological aid to SGBV survivors, including by making referrals to those NGOs.

Implementation of the National Action Plan by the Internally Recognized Government has been minimal due to funding constraints. UNDP engaged a consultant to focus on the issue, but to date no external actions are visible. One development is that the Internally Recognized Government appointed some female judges within the Supreme Court (discussed in more detail above) which is one of the objectives of Yemen’s NAP, as a way of improving justice outcomes for women. The programme is aligned to the overall NAP agenda for Yemen and consortium partners contribute to the NAP in a broad sense. Consortium partners have provided technical assistance, training, and capacity building to local civil society partners and organizations and have organized online and offline campaigns and advocacy initiatives to ensure that the specific needs and challenges faced by women in Yemen are considered. These interventions are crucial to advancing the overall goals of the NAP agenda, including promoting women’s participation in peacebuilding and decision-making processes, addressing sexual and gender-based violence, and supporting the protection and empowerment of women and girls in conflict-affected areas.

Consortium partners have also carried out specific activities that align with the NAP. SOS Foundation, for example, has collaborated with the Ministry of Human Rights and the National Women’s Committee to improve the implementation matrix, by identifying key stakeholders responsible for each stage of the implementation of the NAP. Mansati30 published a report titled: “[How did Yemen deal with UN Resolution 1325?](#)” which gave women activists and experts a platform to express their views on the current NAP and what should be improved. In addition, CARE has actively engaged with the newly appointed international UNDP expert who is tasked to work on the new framework of the NAP, through regular consultation and information sharing on the WPS3 programme..

There was one achievement under “number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen’s NAP 1325” which was the side event held at the Yemen International Forum at the Hague (discussed above).

Domain 4: Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes.

Indicator	Baseline	MTR	Target
Number of women capacitated to advance women’s rights and gender equality	0	53	180
Number of safe SGBV service centres supported and maintained	0	CARE to advise	14
Number and percentage of women capacitated through the programme that take up roles as relief/recovery and peacebuilders	0	CARE to advise	144 ⁶⁹
IATI indicators	Baseline	MTR	Target
# of individuals (female youth) with strengthened capacity (knowledge and skills) to advance women’s rights and gender equality (SADD)	0	159	90

The evaluators could not comment on two indicators and defer to CARE Netherlands and the wider consortium to advise the correct figure. The first is the “Number of safe SGBV service centres supported and maintained”. One key informant mentioned that SOS rehabilitated some SGBV centres, but the desk review of programme documents did not provide any details. Therefore, we defer to the

⁶⁹ 80% of women who are capacitated through the programme



consortium to advise on the correct figure and whether this indicator is still relevant to the programme. The second is “Number and percentage of women capacitated through the programme that take up roles as relief/recovery and peacebuilders.” As discussed with CARE, we will defer to the consortium for this figure as we could not capture this data through the CSO survey.

While the key activity within this Domain was training, there were multiple examples of the consortium leveraging training for a wider purpose, such as achieving more complex outcomes or contributing to long-term outcomes. This strategic use of training is commendable and should be continued and expanded in the next phase. Some specific examples are listed below and also constitute good practice.

Training sometimes provided a mechanism to integrate multiple activities within Domain 4. For example, SOS provided training for 34 women on issues pertaining to SGBV. Some of these women were members of local youth groups that carried out initiatives on peacebuilding and social change. Following the training, members of the youth groups developed local action plans, which were then supported through small grants (seed grants). The action plans involved advocacy campaigns to prevent harassment and SGBV more widely, utilising art, theatres, songs, and social media.⁷⁰ While this example is drawn from a single consortium member (SOS), it offers a model that could be used for consortium-wide collaboration in the next phase.

Training was sometimes used strategically as a form of advocacy to influence powerholders. For example, CARE Yemen integrated dialogue sessions into their training on humanitarian response and reconstruction and ensured the presence of power holders during these dialogue sessions. In exit polls they conducted, the feedback indicated that these power holders were saying it was one of the first times since the war that they had sat down with community members and heard about their issues.⁷¹

Training also created some strategic connections between Domain 3 and Domain 4. A number of authorities were trained in issues related to SGBV during the project period. After some time, there was a case where male workers at a mobile maintenance workshop stole photos from a young woman’s phone while fixing it and blackmailed her (leading to her attempted suicide). The authorities responded to this by offering training for women to learn how to repair mobile phones to empower them with knowledge that would also protect them from potential GBV.⁷² While it is unclear whether the consortium’s training prompted this response, it appears highly likely that the training at least contributed to the action, and it demonstrated a practical application of preventing SGBV by empowering women.

While most seed grants were used for advocacy campaigns that targeted society generally, there was also an example of a seed grant being used to prepare recommendations on enhancing women’s participation in decision-making, which were then presented to the Governor of Taiz. The Governor of Taiz endorsed the recommendations and issued them to all executive offices as a circular.⁷³ It is recommended that this type of targeted advocacy should form a larger focus in the next phase of the programme, as the consortium and the CSOs it works with mature in their approach to advocacy.

⁷⁰ WPS3 Annual Report Y1 - 2021

⁷¹ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 4

⁷² Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 6

⁷³ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 8



5. REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF CHANGE AND INDICATORS

This section reviews the relevance and coherence of the programme's theory of change, which is set out below for reference. It aims to answer several questions:

- How do the achieved intermediate outcomes relate to the higher-level programme outcomes in terms of their contribution?
- Which pathways of change are effectively leading to the overall goal of the programme? (and which are not?) Are there any pathways of change missing in the ToC?
- Are any adjustments required to the theory of change, indicators, or assumptions?

Theory of Change

Goal: Contribute to greater peace and security in Yemen

Objectives

Strategic objective: Women in Yemen meaningfully influence relief, recovery and peace processes

SO-1: More equitable social norms and related practices

SO-2: Enhanced protection for women

SO-3: More inclusive relief, recovery, and peace processes

Preconditions

P1: Civil society strengthening for sustainable civic space

S1: Building CSO capacity and supporting civic space

P2: Physical and digital spaces for dialogue established

S2: Establish and utilise digital spaces for dialogue and action on social norms and women's inclusion

S3: Establish and utilise physical spaces for dialogue to challenge harmful gender norms and promote the rights and priorities of women

Domains of Change

D1: Civil society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence

S4: Comprehensive technical capacity strengthening plan for CSOs

S5: Collaborative CSO initiatives to challenge social norms

S6: Collaborative CSO initiatives to advance women's inclusion in relief, recovery and peace processes

D2: Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership

S7: Building capacity of male champions and community members to act as allies

S8: Targeting men and community members to shift social norms

D3: Formal and informal power-holders are more supportive and responsive to women

S9: Mapping and training of powerholders as allies to advance women's rights and gender equality

S10: Targeting powerholders to shift social norms

S11: Engaging humanitarian actors for gender sensitive approaches and greater adherence to humanitarian principles

S12: Targeting powerholders to promote women's leadership in relief, recovery, and peace processes

S13: Targeting powerholders for the further development and implementation of the Yemen NAP 1325

D4: Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes

S14: Building women's capacity and self-care strategies

S15: Provide accessible and quality SGBV survivor-centred services

S16: Building women's leadership with relief, recovery, and peacebuilding processes



Theory of Change – Domains of Change

D1: Civil Society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence

- IF CSOs and media partners are capacitated to engage in advocacy activities to advance women's participation in relief, recovery and peace processes;
- AND if the interlinkages between these CSOs and media partners are strengthened;
- AND if these CSOs and media partners are representative of Yemeni women;
- THEN they will engage in collective action for influence; advancing women's participation in relief recovery and peace processes.
- Because a diverse and inter-connected civil society will be an effective driver of change when they have legitimacy and voice the concerns of women.

D2: Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership

- IF CSOs and media partners engage with male family members and community members through digital & physical spaces for dialogue;
- AND if male family members and community members are influenced through online and offline campaigns;
- AND if male family members and community members are capacitated to advance women's rights and gender equality;
- THEN they will become more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership.
- Because male family members and community members are willing to act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices.

D3: Formal and informal powerholders are more supportive and responsive to women

- IF CSOs and media partners engage with formal and informal powerholders through digital and physical spaces for dialogue;
- AND if formal and informal powerholders are influenced through various advocacy initiatives including online and offline campaigns;
- AND if formal and informal powerholders are capacitated to advance women's rights and gender equality;
- THEN they will become more supportive and responsive to women's needs and advance women's participation in relief, recovery and peace processes.
- Because formal and informal powerholders are willing to shift power relations and gender roles towards more equality.

D4: Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes

- IF CSOs and media partners engage with women through digital and physical spaces for dialogue;
- AND if women are capacitated to advance women's rights and gender equality;
- AND if women are trained around (digital) safety and self-care;
- AND if humanitarian actors and key local authorities are sensitized on the importance of inclusive approaches;
- AND if women (including women activists) have access to safe SGBV services and skills enhancement;
- THEN they will become empowered to influence relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes.
- Because more women will start influencing relief, recovery and peace processes when they are empowered to do so



How are the intermediate outcomes contributing to the long-term objectives?

There are four intermediate outcomes, which aim to contribute to three long-term objectives, which are: (1) more equitable norms and related practices; (2) enhanced protection for women; and (3) more inclusive relief, recovery, and peacebuilding process. We discuss each intermediate outcome in turn:

D1. Civil society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence

Domain 1 has contributed to long-term objectives 1 and 3 through the advocacy campaigns carried out by CSOs. So far, a large portion of the work with CSOs has been to meet the precondition, namely, to build CSO capacity and support civic space.

The primary way this has been done is through training. While training is important, the results indicate a shortcoming in how CSOs apply the knowledge after the training. No progress was made in the number of CSOs/MOs with an advocacy strategy compared to during the baseline study; for those with an advocacy strategy, almost no organizations reported that the strategy was well known throughout the organisation, and not all CSOs carried out advocacy campaigns. This suggests that training alone is insufficient to build advocacy capacity. Instead, ongoing mentorship and support are required, particularly to address some of the barriers CSO reported, namely lack of expertise and a lack of clarity around advocacy goals. While these topics could also be addressed more thoroughly in training in future, that should still be coupled with ongoing mentorship.

A second gap is the lack of holistic support to civic space, in the sense that the programme has rather taken a project-based approach to advocacy, focusing on supporting specific campaigns one by one rather than looking at what other role CSOs or civil society can play or how individual campaigns contribute to the wider objectives of civil society. This gap should be addressed more in the programme's next phase by developing a more complex idea of how the CSOs relate to civil society and what it means to be a civil society actor in the Yemeni context.

In light of these findings, we suggest adjusting the pathway of change for Domain 1 to make it clear that capacity-building is not just about doing ad hoc advocacy activities, but that CSOs need to develop into mature civil society actors (with constituents and an advocacy strategy.) This may have been implicit in the original pathway of change, but we suggest that articulating it more explicitly will help the consortium to better shape their programming towards this goal. The change is set out in bold below:

D1: Civil Society is capable, representative, and engaged in collective action for influence

- IF CSOs and media partners are supported **to develop into mature civil society actors capable of conducting advocacy** ~~capacitated to engage in advocacy activities~~ to advance women's participation in relief, recovery and peace processes;
- AND if the interlinkages between these CSOs and media partners are strengthened;
- AND if these CSOs and media partners are representative of Yemeni women;
- THEN they will engage in collective action for influence; advancing women's participation in relief recovery and peace processes.
- Because a diverse and inter-connected civil society will be an effective driver of change when they have legitimacy and voice the concerns of women.

Some CSOs carried out advocacy campaigns in favour of equitable norms, and this likely contributed to the positive (albeit minor) change in social norms, particularly given that contribution analysis found that the proliferation of NGOs and CSOs in Yemen has brought visibility and momentum to the issue of women's participation and leadership and contribution to a change in norms and also offered women opportunities to participate in and lead relief, recovery and peacebuilding activities. One limitation is that it is difficult to systematically track the impact of the CSO campaigns, an issue discussed in the section below on adjustments to indicators.

CSOs may have contributed to long-term objective three if they received training in SGBV and then applied that knowledge in some way or carried out advocacy campaigns on women's protection.



However, it is difficult to track this connection as the indicators related to women's protection focus on powerholders and building the capacity of individual women and men. In the next phase, if the consortium reduces the number of CSOs it works with and focuses on a smaller number of strategic, coordinated advocacy interventions as well as specific powerholders, it may wish to consider whether CSOs should focus on women's protection as one key issue, as a means of drawing a stronger connection between sub-objective two and Domain one.

D2. Male family members and community members are more aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership

Domain 2 appears to have contributed to long-term outcomes one and three. The key positive change in social norms was a decrease in the number of men who oppose women's participation in peacebuilding and relief/recovery activities, indicating both an improvement in social norms and a more inclusive environment for women. While the consortium's activities are not the only factor contributing to this change, the consortium has reached a huge number of viewers with their online campaigns that have drawn attention to women's role in relief, recovery and peacebuilding. There are multiple stories from men noting that their understanding changed after hearing about women's efforts.

However, one risk with Domain 2 is that the online and offline activities may target men already aware and supportive of women's positive contributions and leadership. This would benefit from further consideration, including how to measure the 'baseline' attitudes of those engaged in the consortium's advocacy platforms.

D.3 Formal and informal powerholders are more supportive and responsive to women

Domain 3 has contributed to all three long-term objectives. There have been some positive contributions; for example, relevant to long-term objectives one and three, some powerholders have acted as allies to discourage discriminatory norms, which may have contributed to the reduction in opposition to women's participation. Under long-term objective two, powerholders have been trained in SGBV, and there were instances after the training where the powerholder took steps to protect women better or respond to instances of SGBV.

However, one shortcoming of long-term objective 2 (but which also affects long-term objectives one and three) is that there have not been any high-level policies, laws, or regulations (formal) implemented. This is undoubtedly due partly to the political situation in Yemen; however, another limiting factor is that consortium partners targeted different powerholders, and there was no clear strategy on who to engage and on what issues. Developing this consortium-wide strategy on the engagement of powerholders and harnessing the efforts of the CSOs within this strategy should be a focus of the next phase and should increase the impact that Domain two has on the long-term objectives.

Alternatively, if the consortium is only focused on changing social norms and not on changing formal policies, laws, or regulations, we suggest adjusting the wording of the indicators to make this clear. We suggest that the targets can remain the same since they are set reasonably even if changed to include only social norm changes.

D.4 Women are empowered to influence relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes

Domain 4 dovetails with long-term objective 3, and the data that speaks to both subjects is mixed: the qualitative data consistently indicated that women's participation and leadership in relief, recovery and peacebuilding processes has increased over the past two years; however, the quantitative data suggested it had in fact decreased.

The consortium has certainly provided many opportunities for women to improve their skillsets (via training) and to participate in and lead advocacy efforts (via the CSOs or through the different online and offline platforms.) As at the MTR, the methodology is not available to understand how many women trained by the consortium became relief or recovery workers or peacebuilders. However, this question should be investigated, with each consortium member contacting the women they trained.



Effectiveness of pathways of change and associated activities

The objectives of the programme’s theory of change are still highly relevant for the targeted population.

The evaluators agree with a findings by the consortium during an internal examination of the theory of change at the end of year 2, that while progress has been made towards achieving the desired outputs in all of the Domains, but in particular in Domain 1 (civil society strengthening) and Domain 3 (power holders), several outputs lack connections with key outcomes/pathways of change, making it difficult to measure the overall contributions of the pathways to the programme’s overall objectives/indicators. To this end, we would like to draw attention to three components of the program: (1) online advocacy activities; (2) capacity strengthening of CSOs; and (3) seed grants.

First, as discussed in more detail in the section on assumptions below, the programme’s long-term objectives aim to create change in social norms and in the inclusiveness of relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities at the level of society generally. Therefore, the indicators aim to measure changes in the perceptions of ‘ordinary’ community members, many (if not all) of whom have not participated in the programme. Meanwhile, many (if not most) of the advocacy activities take place online. While it is clear that the online activities are having a significant impact on those who participate in the online platform, it is not clear if these activities are influencing the wider society. We suggest to incorporate more thorough measurements of the online activities (such as measuring attitudes before participation) to better understand how the online activities are contributing to wider social change.

Second, capacity strengthening of CSOs has had a mixed impact. Some CSOs have attended training but not conducted any advocacy campaign (according to the survey conducted with CSOs for the midterm review.) The most effective training model appears to be when the training is either supported by ongoing mentorship and support to conduct campaigns or other activities or when the training is used as a gateway to dialogue or advocacy with training participants. Therefore, while there is no suggested adjustment to the indicator, we suggest that in the second phase, no standalone training is conducted; rather, training should be utilised strategically with a clear connection to intermediate and long-term outcomes. Detailed examples in other sections of this report draw on the consortium’s existing work.

And third, the seed grants caused the programme to scatter in various directions. One lesson learned here should be that if the consortium agrees to such terms, stronger links should be established between these economic initiatives and the overall programme objectives. The consortium should ensure that these economic endeavours align with the other activities and outcomes of the programme. In essence, the consortium should consider how such economic initiatives can still contribute to the political empowerment of these women.⁷⁴

Relevance of assumptions

The programme’s theory of change is informed by a number of assumptions at each level, detailed in the table below.

Table 2: Assumptions underpinning the theory of change

Theory of change level	Assumption
Strategic objective	1. Meaningful participation of Yemeni women in humanitarian response and peace processes will contribute to peace and security for everyone
Sub-objectives	2. Changes in social norms contribute to better protection of women and more inclusive humanitarian response and peace processes

⁷⁴ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 4



	<p>3. Protection for women improves because of greater awareness of, and capacity to contribute to, methods of prevention of SGBV, and delivering survivor-centred responses.</p> <p>4. Inclusive relief, recovery and peace processes can be achieved through preventing SGBV and transforming harmful social norms and related discriminatory practices</p>
<p>Domains of change</p>	<p>5. A diverse and inter-connected civil society will be an effective driver of change when they have legitimacy and voice the concerns of women.</p> <p>6. Male family members and community members are willing to act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices.</p> <p>7. Formal and informal power-holders are willing to shift power relations and gender roles towards more equality.</p> <p>8. More women will start influencing relief, recovery and peace processes when they are empowered to do so</p>

The assumptions underpinning the theory of change remain relevant. However, the MTR revealed two additional assumptions that are implicit, but which should be articulated in order to better acknowledge what is feasible for the programme to achieve in the timeframe. These are:

1. Measurable change to social norms is possible to achieve in the timeframe associated with the programme milestones (such as the MTR). We suggest that this should be added to the list of sub-objective assumptions. This assumption recognizes that the barriers to social norm change in Yemen are extremely high – such as an ongoing conflict and peace process, conservative social norms, and restrictive civil society space. While these issues are captured in the risk profile, we suggest that because they are a fundamental part of the context they also affect and shape the theory of change. By articulating this assumption, it helps to acknowledge that even a small degree of change to social norms is significant in the context. One of the findings of the MTR was that due to intensifying barriers to women’s participation (such as the campaign against NGOs, *mahram* law, and deterioration in public safety), the assumption that measurable change to social norms is possibly to achieve in a two-year period was significantly challenged.
2. Engaging with Yemeni society via online activities will contribute to changes in social norms amongst the wider society. We suggest that this should be added to the list of assumptions associated with the domains of change. In the existing theory of change, the outcomes and indicators are framed as targeting social generally – the change in social norms, for example, is expected to happen amongst the broader society and not only amongst the select group that participate in programme activities. However, the MTR revealed layers of impact: data collected by Manasati30 (as part of their own reporting and not specific to this MTR) found that their online activities had significant impact on the beliefs and attitudes of people who participated in their online forums⁷⁵; then the MTR found that people who have a connection with NGOs (such as staff and beneficiaries) also recognized an improvement in social norms, but ‘ordinary’ community members who do not have a connection to an NGO perceived a regression in social norms. This raises questions within the theory of change as to whether there is a logical connection between the activities and the intended target. While at present, it seems that the (implicit) assumption that online activities will influence social norms amongst the wider society has not proven accurate, it is too early in the programme to reach this conclusion definitively (particularly given the challenging context in Yemen). However, we suggest that this issue requires further discussion between consortium members to ensure that they have a common understanding of whose social norms they are trying to change, and what degree of change is feasible to expect from the type of activities being implemented (i.e. is it feasible to expect the social norms of the community as a whole to change if the bulk of activities take place online.)

⁷⁵ For example, Manasati30’s 2022 annual report noted that an average of 73% of respondents who had engaged with in a Manasati30 platform reported an increase in knowledge to a “large” extent, while 67% of respondents admitted a behavioural change related to the topics discussed on the Manasati30 website. Some respondents also gave examples of behavioural change due to engaging in the Manasati platform.



6. ADJUSTMENT THEORY OF CHANGE AND INDICATORS

6.1 OVERALL ADJUSTMENTS

This section identifies some overall adjustments that the consortium may consider for the programme's second half.

Develop engagement plan marginalized groups/minority voice

The first suggestion relates to targeting particular groups of women (namely, women with disabilities, Muhamasheen, and IDPs.) The programme's primary goal is to empower women in Yemen, and it specifies a focus that includes Muhamasheen, IDPs, and women with disabilities since they are consistently excluded from relief, recovery, and peace processes and are at higher risk of experiencing SGBV. There was minimal evidence that the programme was consistently targeting these groups. One campaign aimed to increase the attendance of women with disabilities at university, but there doesn't seem to be systematic engagement with women with disabilities. Similarly, one CSO indicated that they work with Muhamasheen. Still, Muhamasheen do not appear to have been targeted for offline activities. The survey data indicates that Muhamasheen do not have regular internet access and, therefore, are likely not participating regularly in online activities (and we could not identify any steps taken by any online forum to engage Muhamasheen directly). Equally, while IDPs may have participated in online and offline activities, there does not appear to be any consistent engagement of IDP women.

Each of these proposed target groups – women with disabilities, Muhamasheen women, and IDP women – each face specific and unique barriers to engaging not only in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities, but also in online and offline activities such as training or advocacy. As such, in order to effectively engage them in the programme, it would be necessary to develop an engagement strategy for each group and invest consistent effort in reaching them through the various activities. This degree of investment seems beyond what is feasible in the current programme, given staff resources. Therefore, we suggest one option could be to focus only on one of these target groups and intensify the effort to engage them, including developing a specific engagement plan. If, in fact, the consortium is already tailored its activities to these groups and sufficient examples were not captured in the MTR, we suggest that this could form a focus of the next annual report, and that the second half of the programme could work on further developing this tailored engagement.

Focus on fewer number of CSOs

The consortium currently works in both Aden and Taiz, although there is some separation: all partners are in Aden, while CARE is also present in Taiz. This is causing fragmentation and also hampering the learning of the partners, raising a question of whether to streamline locations and reduce the number of locations where the consortium works.⁷⁶

The MTR identified positive outcomes in both Aden and Taiz and a need for programming in both locations – however, a key recommendation is to reduce the number of CSOs that the consortium works with, and to also collectively target the same powerholders on specific issues, in order to intensify the impact of the programme and the likelihood of achieving positive results. When the consortium reviews which CSOs to work with and which powerholders to target, location should be one important variable. It might be that both Aden and Taiz remain in the portfolio but that the consortium targets issues, powerholders, or CSOs that are common to both; or that a small number of CSOs are identified in each location but then as the consortium consolidates its efforts onto that smaller group, the dual location may be less of an issue.

⁷⁶ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3

6.2 ADJUSTMENTS FOR INDICATORS AND TARGETS

This section identifies the indicators that we recommend should be adjusted in some way, both from the internal set of WPS indicators and the IATI indicators. The changes are summarized in the table below, and then explained in the subsequent sections.

Table 3: Proposed changes to indicators and targets

Category	Existing Indicator and Target	Proposed Change
IATI	Number of CSOs that have enhanced representation of constituencies Target: 37 Achieved: 0	Reduce the target to 10.
IATI	Number of CSOs included in SPs programmes Target: 37 Achieved: 9	Reduce the target to 15.
IATI	# of governmental policies & strategies blocked, adopted or improved to eradicate all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private life Target: 2 Achieved: 0	Suggest to delink the indicator from the program, and only report against the indicator “# of governmental policies & strategies blocked, adopted or improved to promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention, peace- and state-building and protect women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations.”
WPS	Signs of change in discriminatory social norms and related practices including SGBV Target: 6 Achieved: 2	Reduce the target to 4
WPS	Number of men and (influential) community members that are more aware of women’s positive contribution and leadership Target: 1,500 Achieved: Unclear due to lack of clarity in methodology	Suggest to change the indicator from a number (1,500) to a percentage – of 75%, which is calculated with a minimum sample size of 50 respondents.
WPS	Number and percentage of women within the Consortium’s network that were able to access information on SGBV services in a safe way, including those who self-report during Consortium service provision activities as survivors of SGBV Target: 3,000 Achieved: 450	Reduce the target to 1,000 IF the achieved figure of 450 is correct as at end 2023. ⁷⁷
WPS	Signs of change showing that Yemen’s NAP 1325 is further developed by the International Recognised Government	Reduce the target to 3

⁷⁷ The figure of 450 was taken from the 2022 annual report for Manasati30, which is the most recent data available to the evaluators.



	(IRG) and implemented by relevant ministries and local authorities Target: 9 Achieved: 0	
WPS	Number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen’s NAP 1325 Target: 9 Achieved: 1	Reduce the target to 3

IATI indicator: Number of CSOs that have enhanced representation of constituencies

There is a series of IATI indicators addressing “the number of CSOs that have enhanced representation of constituencies.” In year 2, no progress was report on this indicator, raising the question of whether the current programme contributes to this change and whether it is appropriate to measure it on a yearly basis.

One limitation in meeting this indicator is that the CSOs in the programme do not appear to have constituencies, taken here to mean a group of people who they represent and advocate on behalf of their interests. At present the CSOs carry out short-term campaigns on a social issue (such as equality, or harassment) that may affect a specific group of people (such as women.) They also sometimes advocate on behalf of specific groups, for instance the campaign to support women with disabilities to attend university. But none of the CSOs permanently represent women with disabilities or engage in the long-term with a specific group with the intention of representing them.

This shortcoming is linked to the fact that CSOs work in a project-based manner and do not consider their wider role as a civil society actor. If the CSOs mature and begin to envision and carry out their role in a more holistic manner, this indicator will become relevant. We suggest that going forward, the consortium should work with a select group of CSOs to identify constituents and how to represent them. In addition, the target should be reduced from 37 to 10 (in recognition of the fact that the consortium will work with a smaller group of CSOs.)

IATI indicator: Number of CSOs included in SPs programmes

There is a series of indicators measuring whether CSOs are included in programming – which is taken to mean “first and second tier partners;” that is, those that are included in the alliance agreement and those who a directly contracted by anyone within the consortium. To date, the consortium has only included CSOs with whom the consortium has established partnership agreements, which is a total of 9. There are more CSOs with whom the consortium collaborated; however, not all have established partnership agreements.

The MTR recommends that the consortium reduce the number of CSOs it works with, in order to intensify and better target support. In line with this, we also recommend that the target for this indicator is reduced from 37 to 15.

IATI indicator: Number of governmental policies & strategies blocked, adopted or improved to eradicate all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private life

There is a second identical indicator whose focus is to ‘promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention, peace- and state-building and protect women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations.’ This indicator has been reported against and appears to be well-suited to the programme. There is some potential overlap between the two indicators (given the proximity between ‘eradicate all forms of violence’ and ‘protect women’s rights.’) The programme has already taken some steps to streamline its activities, including reducing the focus on SGBV programming. Since ‘protect women’s rights’ can capture activities linked to SGBV, we suggest to delete the WPS indicator linkages to of the IATI indicators on violence against women.



IATI indicator: CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands

Currently, the consortium aligns the IATI indicator “Number of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on women’s voice, agency, leadership and representative participation in decision-making processes in public, private, and civic sphere, through agenda-setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building” with the programme’s internal indicator, which is: “Number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels”.

In addition, it links IATI indicator “# of times that CSOs succeed in creating space for CSO demands and positions on promote women’s meaningful and equal participation and leadership in conflict prevention and peace- and state-building and protecting women’s and girls’ rights in crisis and (post-)conflict situations, through agenda setting, influencing the debate and/or movement building” with the programme’s two internal indicator, which are:

- (1) “Number of cases where men and (influential) community members act as allies in discouraging discriminatory norms and practices and promoting positive masculinities through (social) media, public speeches and other channels”; and
- (2) “Number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen’s NAP 1325” which achieved a figure of 1, being the Hague conference.

The evaluators found that the link between (a) CSOs succeeding in creating space for CSO demands and (b) men and influential community members acting as allies unclear and tenuous, given there is insufficient evidence linking the decision of men to act as allies with the work of CSOs. We suggest that the consortium should re-consider linking these indicators.

WPS indicator: Signs of change in discriminatory social norms

One of the indicators related to SO1 is ‘Signs of change in discriminatory social norms and related practices including SGBV.’ The target is 6, and the mid-term review finding is that 2 signs of change has been achieved. As the earlier section explains in more detail, whether or not social norms have changed is a complex question and the qualitative and quantitative data collected for this mid-term review told different stories. In terms of the indicator, we decided to reflect the change identified in the household survey since it was the clearest indication of a specific change, whereas in the qualitative data, although respondents agreed that social norms had changed for the better, when we drilled down into specific there were no clear trends as to who had changed their view of social norms, making it difficult to include as a specific, delineated achievement.

With this in mind, we suggest to reduce the target for this indicator, since it is very difficult to achieve consensus and pin down a specific change in a relatively short timeframe (of approximately every two years) It seems likely that the impact of the programme will increase at speed in the latter phase of implementation, as more time passes. At the same time, the consortium cannot control the contextual factors that undermine progress, such as strong opposition by a small segment of the community, restrictions on operations, or a resurgence of the war, for instance. In light of all of the above factors, we suggest to reduce the number of signs of change to 4. In addition, we suggest that the consortium agree how to measure this indicator and whether quantitative data or qualitative data will be utilized, and what will happen if different data sources contradict each other. Contribution analysis should be retained as a method of analysing how much of the change can be attributed to the programme. However, before contribution analysis takes place it is necessary to agree how change will be measured (namely, through quantitative or qualitative tools). In the MTR, contribution analysis was important to understanding the role of the consortium both when a change took place and when it didn’t (for example, when a regression in social norms took place, contribution analysis helped to understand why.)

WPS indicator: Number of men and (influential) community members that are more aware of women’s positive contribution and leadership



On the number of men and (influential) community members that are more aware of women's positive contribution and leadership, the household survey sought to understand the level of men's awareness. Male respondents agreed (strongly or somewhat strongly) with the following statements:

- Women can be equally good leaders as men: 67% (n=40)
- Women play an equally important role as men in ensuring long-lasting peace: 75% (n=45)
- Women play an equally important role as men in shaping the future of Yemen: 78%(n=47)

There are some methodological challenges with this indicator and its target. A household survey would likely not have a sample size large enough to draw a connection to the current target of 1,500 individuals. Equally, the number of individuals trained is unlikely to reach 1,500. If we consider the reach of online advocacy campaigns that aim to increase men's awareness of women's positive contributions, the audience is well beyond 1,500 (in the tens of thousands).

Therefore, we suggest that this target is revised and the methodology clarified. We suggest to replace the numerical target with a percentage, and set a minimum sample size. In the MTR we utilized the household survey with a sample size of 51; therefore, we suggest to keep a minimum sample size of 50. Future surveys may wish to replicate the question used in the MTR to measure this change, which was the percentage of men who agreed with the statement 'women play an equally important role as men in ensuring long-lasting peace.'

WPS indicators associated with the NAP 1325

There are 2 WPS indicators associated with Yemen's NAP 1325: (1) Signs of change showing that Yemen's NAP 1325 is further developed by the Internationally Recognised Government and implemented by relevant ministries and local authorities; and (2) Number of cases where government and humanitarian actors outside Yemen promote the further development and implementation of Yemen's NAP 1325. In both cases the target is set as 9, and progress to date has been minimal due largely to factors outside the consortium's control, such as the lack of formal action on the part of the Internationally Recognised Government, as well as poor engagement on the WPS generally by actors outside of Yemen. Therefore, we recommend to reduce the target for both indicators to 3.



7. REVIEW OF THE PARTNERSHIP

This section reviews four components of partnership within the programme: (1) collaboration within the consortium; (2) learning agenda; (3) local ownership and collaboration with CSOs; and (4) collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch Embassy.

7.1 CONSORTIUM COLLABORATION

The consortium model has a number of strengths and demonstrates a range of good practices that provide a strong foundation to build on in the second phase of the programme. Having multiple organizations collaborating on women, peace, and security in a challenging context like Yemen is not easy and is a positive development in and of itself. Each consortium partner brings different but complementary expertise and capacities to the programme, and the theory of change and programme activities aim to capitalize on these different but complementary roles. Partners have been able to support each other with different tasks as well as networking, which has helped the Consortium to maintain momentum and pursue its objectives despite challenges and setbacks. Consortium members have also coordinated resources and knowledge, for instance by sharing the powerholder mapping exercise, and coordinating the engagement of WPS qualified trainers and consultants, which is important given their scarcity in Yemen.

Table 9. Role of consortium partners⁷⁸

Consortium Partners	Role
CARE NL	Technical support & MoFA liaison and contractual management; overall programme leadership and consortium coordination/management
CARE Yemen	Programme implementation in Yemen (Aden and Taiz); coordination with local stakeholders including local authorities; community interventions & campaigns; national & Taiz level protection; peace process track 3 engagement; local women’s leadership in Taiz; and civil society strengthening CARE Yemen works with one implementing partner, namely Generation without Qat.
RNW Media	Strengthening online civic engagement of young people including online campaigning; creating safe and inclusive digital spaces for women to amplify their voices on peace building; digital capacity strengthening RNW Media works with one implementing partner, namely Manasati30
SOS	Grassroots women liaison; Aden level community campaigns and protection; local women’s leadership in Aden

There are also clear signs of solidarity between consortium members and a collective concern to ensure the safety of all staff in the consortium. This was seen when the campaign against women working in NGOs began. At that time, all three logos were routinely displayed in the consortium’s social media campaigns (namely, CARE, SOS, and the RNW Media). In order to protect the staff in all organizations, the consortium reduced the visibility of CARE and increased the visibility of SOS (as a national NGO, since the effects were not as strong against national actors) without compromising communication with their followers. This level of cooperation and adaptability is commendable.⁷⁹

One area to consider in the next phase is the way that consortium governance is approached. There was a strong desire amongst partners to hold in-person meetings and to engage more on strategic issues such as the monitoring and evaluation framework. Face-to-face engagement is likely to be

⁷⁸ CARE, RNW Media, and SOS Foundation (October 2020) Women, Peace and Security: Full proposal to Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a strategic partnership, women, peace and security grant instrument

⁷⁹ Key informant interview with MFA and Embassy, interview 1



difficult given that partners are spread across Sana (some consortium staff members), Aden, Taiz, and the Netherlands, but there may be other ways to strengthen the frequency and quality of interactions. A stronger role for SOS and Manasati30 as Yemen-based organisations is recommended and is addressed in the section on local ownership below.

Another area to strengthen in the next phase is coordination and integration of activities. At present, although the theory of change on paper tells an integrated story, consortium members tend to deliver their own activities independently of each other. The combination of skills and resources held by each partner has the potential to achieve significant outcomes and make a substantial impact. However, this potential added value is not felt yet. Dividing the strategic objectives of the programme among partners in this way helped speed up the implementation of the programme. However, while speed may have been a priority when the programme was first starting (particularly given that authorities were slow to provide approvals and delayed the start of the programme), now that the programme has matured it has become increasingly clear that operating separately has shortcomings and there is significant value in collaborating at the activity or campaign level.⁸⁰ Suggestions for how to do this include:

- Develop a clear plan to operationalize the programme and particularly the theory of change within the consortium for the remaining grant period. The plan should detail the role of each partner, outline how coordination will work day-to-day, and identify opportunities to undertake joint or at least aligned programming.
- Develop a joint advocacy plan and joint approach to engaging powerholders. This will help to intensify and strategic advocacy efforts, which will increase their impact.
- Develop a joint approach to influencing powerholders. This should draw on the powerholder mapping completed earlier in the programme and seek to identify the interests of the target powerholder and then tailor any advocacy efforts to those interests. A collaborative approach would help to intensify and better target advocacy, which may lead to greater results. It will also make it easier for consortium partners to benefit from the networks of other partners.
- Connect online and offline activities implemented by different partners. At present, online and offline activities of a single consortium partner are sometimes integrated, and there are several examples where this integrated had a very positive outcome (see section on Good Practices.)
- Harmonise the way that monitoring is carried out. At present, partners seems to use different methodologies to report on achievements, count beneficiaries, and measure their impact.

Another area to improve – and where consortium collaboration may be of value – is what happens after training. While there have been some creative ideas about how to proceed (details in the section on best practices), there is still a need for more structured follow-up and sustainability in the post-training phase. Coaching, group formation, and one-on-one follow-ups have been initiated, but the sheer volume of activities and the transition to online engagement have made follow-up more challenging. Following up with individuals who have completed training is a vital component of ensuring sustainability.⁸¹

As a way of strengthening local ownership (discussed in the next section), the consortium should also consider how to strengthen the role of the Yemen-based organizations in governance and management of the consortium. In particular, the consortium may benefit from shifting coordination responsibilities to a Yemen-based partner, since that would make face-to-face meetings, networking, and information sharing easier for those in-country. Since this requires resources and budget it will be important to consider what is realistically possible. But shifting more of the governance and management responsibilities would likely improve the effectiveness of the consortium and strengthen its impact, and would also contribute to sustainability and the desired shift in power to the global south.

⁸⁰ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 8

⁸¹ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 4



7.2 REVIEW OF THE LEARNING AGENDA

The first product from the learning agenda, which focused on CSOs, is nearly completed. The other products are still in the data collection phase. The products have the potential to play a significant role in reshaping and rebuilding the programme, as they raise critical questions and provide evidence for the programme's goals and outcomes.

One issue to consider in the next phase of the project is how to ensure that all members of the Consortium feel ownership over these learning products, and how all Consortium members can integrate the findings of the learning products into their programmes and practices.

A short-coming is that the learning agenda is being led from the Netherlands with support of CARE Yemen, but should ideally be led by partners working in Yemen. This requires resources and budget so may be challenging to move entirely, but the consortium should consider how to strengthen the role of Yemen-based partners in the agenda.⁸² This would also help address knowledge transfer and retention, since it is likely that if a local partner is taking a stronger role in (or ideally leading) the learning agenda, they will engage more intensively with the findings and also shape the way knowledge is communicated, which may make the knowledge more accessible to staff in the local organizations.

7.3 LOCAL OWNERSHIP

There are several good practices within the consortium model and programme design that support local ownership, which should be continued and enhanced going forward.

First, the consortium includes one Yemeni organization, SOS Foundation for Development, and two Yemeni implementing partners, namely Manasati30 and Generation without Qat. SOS is responsible for building partnerships with other organizations and actors in Yemen and creating opportunities to collaborate with these organizations and actors.⁸³ In order to strengthen the shift in power to the global south, one suggestion going forward is to consider how the role SOS plays within the Consortium can be adapted to strengthen their leadership or the strategic value they bring as a Yemeni partner. SOS should lead any discussions on this potential, so that the direction reflects how it would like to develop as an organization and what is realistically within its capacity and interests. However, one finding from the evaluation generally was the importance of strengthening shared governance and decision-making within the consortium, and particularly with the Yemen-based actors.

Second, before the start of the grant period, Manasati30 started the process from being a project of consortium member RNW Media (which is a Dutch organization) to becoming an independent organization. This process was finalised during the grant period. This means that Manasati30 is responsible for its own programming and has full ownership over its content, website and activities. RNW Media's role has changed from holding substantial control over the design and implementation of Manasati30 programmes, to a support role, providing Manasati30 with grant management, capacity strengthening, and support with consortium reporting and collaboration. The elevation of a Yemeni organization in a way that recognizes their strengths and capacities and genuinely empowers them to lead their own programming is a significant accomplishment and makes a valuable contribution to local ownership.

Going forward, as a way of strengthening the shift in power to the global south, it would be useful to consider how Manasati30 can take on additional or different responsibilities within the consortium that would provide it with opportunity to develop leadership and programming skills. While RNW Media will continue to provide support, being a member of a consortium offers a range of opportunities to develop skills and capacities in an operational environment and learn from the different partners. As noted with SOS above, Manasati30 should lead any discussions on this potential expansion or adjustment in its role, so that the direction reflects how it would like to develop as an organization and what is realistically within its capacity and interests.


⁸² Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3

⁸³ WPS in Yemen Activity Plan Narrative 2022



Third, a significant focus of the consortium’s activities (as well as a key component of the theory of change) is developing and supporting a strong civil society, which involves working with local CSOs. The MTR investigated this component of the programme in depth, including how CSOs perceived their role in the programme and whether they perceived a shift in power towards the global south. Overall, most CSOs felt they could design their own activities after they received training from the consortium, and seed grant recipients also felt that the training gave them to skills to design their initiatives. The quantitative data provides additional insights and is discussed below.


Figure 16. Compared to two years ago, do you feel there has been a change in the power balance between local and international organisations in WPS programming?



CSO representatives were asked about their perception of power balance shifts between local and international organisations involved in WPS programming.⁸⁴ As shown in the figure above, most CSOs felt that local organisations had gained power or the power balance had remained relatively stable. Most MOs, on the other hand, reported decreased power for local organisations, although the limited sample size does not allow for definitive conclusions. Respondents that perceived an increase in power for local organisations cited a growing recognition of their enhanced contextual understanding, which had resulted in increased funding allocations to them.

Conversely, CSOs/MOs who perceived a reduction in power for local organisations reported that international organisations dictated project activity design due to their funding control. One respondent noted a challenge in local organisations’ ability to ensure a comparable level of quality as international organisations due to the difference in budget awarded to local and international organisations.

Figure 17. Compared to two years ago, do you feel there has been a change in the power balance between local and international organisations in SGBV programming?




⁸⁴ Face-to-face surveys – yes, local organizations have more control over programming: 50%, yes, local organizations have less control over programming: 33%, no, the power balance has stayed the same: 8%, I don't know: 8%
 Online surveys – yes, local organizations have more control over programming: 29%, yes, local organizations have less control over programming: 14%, no, the power balance has stayed the same: 50%, I don't know: 7%



Similarly, the CSOs/MOs were asked about the power dynamics concerning SGBV programming.⁸⁵ Most CSOs/MOs reported that international organisations were gaining control or that the power balance had remained unchanged. They highlighted that international organisations have a strong interest in SGBV programming and therefore want to exert more control over it. Furthermore, it was noted that funding was predominantly under the control of international organisations despite the notable strengths local organisations bring to the table.

Figure 18. International agencies have too much influence over local agencies in ...



CSO representatives were then asked the extent to which international agencies exert influence over the programme management of local agencies.⁸⁶ Respondents overwhelmingly felt that international agencies exert influence over all aspects of programming, with the highest influence over programme priority settings and the lowest over daily operational decisions. Nevertheless, respondents overwhelmingly agreed with all four statements. This underscores a desire among local organisations to enhance their decision-making authority in programming, particularly concerning higher-level strategic decisions such as setting programme priorities, designing activities, and determining funding allocation.

Respondents acknowledged that some progress had been made concerning the collaboration between international and local organisations.⁸⁷ In particular, CSOs/MOs acknowledged advancements in strengthening trust and enhancing collaboration between international and local organisations. However, there was a lesser conviction regarding progress in amplifying the voice of local partners in programme design, augmenting direct funding for local organisations, and enhancing the capacity of local organisations.


⁸⁵ Face-to-face surveys – yes, local organizations have more control over programming: 24%, yes, local organizations have less control over programming: 50%, no, the power balance has stayed the same: 25%, I don't know: 0%
 Online surveys – yes, local organizations have more control over programming: 14%, yes, local organizations have less control over programming: 29%, no, the power balance has stayed the same: 43%, I don't know: 14%

⁸⁶ The majority of respondents surveyed face-to-face and online reported either strongly agreeing or somewhat agreeing that international agencies have too much influence over local agencies in setting programme priorities, designing activities, and deciding how funding is allocated. For daily operating decisions, the who completed the survey online in majority agreed strongly or somewhat that international agencies have too much influence over local agencies in this area. Those who completed the survey face-to-face, however, had more nuanced perceptions regarding the influence of international agencies over local agencies in daily operating decision (strongly agree: 25%, somewhat agree: 17%, neither agree nor disagree: 17%, somewhat disagree: 33%, strongly disagree: 8%)

⁸⁷ Similar sentiments were given by respondents completing the survey face-to-face and online for all statements aside from strengthening the trust between international agencies and local partners (Face-to-face – major progress: 67%, minor progress: 33%. Online - major progress: 33%, minor progress: 50%, no progress: 7%, I don't know: 7%) and improving cooperation between international agencies and local partners (Face-to-face – major progress: 42%, minor progress: 50%, no progress: 8%. Online - major progress: 50%, minor progress: 36%, no progress: 14%)



Figure 19. In the past two years, has there been major, minor, or no progress toward ...



7.4 PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EMBASSY

There was consensus across consortium members, the Ministry, and the Embassy that the partnership with the Ministry and Embassy is valuable and should be further strengthened in the second half of the programme.

There appears to be a unique relationship between the consortium (on the one hand) and the Ministry and Embassy (on the other) that is less formal than typically exists and that offers a higher degree of support and solidarity compared to other settings. One consortium member explained:

“What I really appreciate is that they are very involved. They like to meet the partners and wanted to join calls with the consortium partners. This was really good...”⁸⁸

The open communication that exists, as well as the Ministry’s close coordination with the consortium has enabled it to understand the challenges and sensitivities in real time, and apply a more flexible approach in response. The Ministry’s willingness to accommodate changes (when required by the context) has allowed the project to adapt and progress more effectively:

“These collaborative efforts ensure that all stakeholders, whether from the donor or implementing side, share common priorities and resonate with the project’s results. This enhances the effectiveness and impact of the programme and our collective efforts.”⁸⁹

This relationship and flexible way of interacting is a strength of the programme and particularly important when working in a place as volatile and challenging as Yemen.

All parties highly valued the practice of sharing information and experiences about WPS and SGBV programming in Yemen. Within both the MFA and Embassy there are staff with expertise and long experience in Yemen, which enables them to engage with the consortium at a strategic level and offer a valuable and grounded perspective. Equally, consortium members help the Embassy and MFA stay

⁸⁸ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3

⁸⁹ Key informant interview with MFA and Embassy, interview 1



informed about WPS initiatives which are not always visible to external actors. Consortium members also valued the monitoring and evaluation support they received from the Ministry and Embassy, which included getting direct support from the IATI helpdesk, as well as learning sessions and webinars, which were co-organized by the MFA.⁹⁰

Consortium members particularly valued the networking support that the Embassy has provided, as it has facilitated meetings with other organisations in order to exchange insights and experiences.⁹¹ This was a practice they wished to continue, noting that the Embassy has other strategic partners in other countries (i.e. outside Yemen) who the consortium could learn from.⁹² A second example of valuable facilitation and networking took place at the International Yemen Forum in the Hague in 2023. The Ministry helped Consortium partners in the Netherlands co-organize a side-event at the Forum on the WPS agenda, which was a significant advocacy opportunity and generated valuable discussions.⁹³

The MTR recommends that in the second half of the programme, the consortium should focus more on taking its advocacy beyond the local, and potentially ‘internationalizing’ both its advocacy and WPS work by engaging more directly with Yemen’s National Action Plan. In doing this, the consortium would benefit from the Ministry and Embassy’s support to strategize how it can develop its advocacy and WPS work at the national or international level, including support to identify potential targets, allies, and ways to frame advocacy messages that would engage an international audience. The Ministry and Embassy may also support by connecting the consortium to appropriate diplomatic channels, including the UN and the EU, as well as advising on the political landscape associated with those channels. This would be really valuable in supporting the consortium to advance its objectives through engagement with an international audience.

⁹⁰ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3

⁹¹ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 6

⁹² Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3

⁹³ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 3



8. SUSTAINABILITY

This section discusses what is being done to ensure the sustainability of programme results, and whether these efforts are likely to influence the sustainability of the programme. Overall, the consortium has identified a number of pathways and practices to achieve sustainability that appear promising, but still have some way to go in order to be effective. This should form the focus of the second half of the programme. The discussion below identifies the existing pathways and how they could be strengthened to ensure sustainability of programme results.

The first existing pathway is working with various CSOs, developing their capacity, and connecting them with powerholders. This is particularly valuable as it also contributes to a shift in power to the Global South, which is fundamental to sustainability. However, there are some limitations that need to be addressed to make this strategy more effective. The results of this MTR (see Domain 1 above) highlighted that many CSOs are not proficient in advocacy, do not have an advocacy strategy, have a poor understanding of how to influence political agendas, and have weak connections with authorities and lack clear constituencies.⁹⁴ Strengthening these capacities and linkages are crucial for sustainability, and could be addressed in part by taking a more targeted approach to working with CSOs, as described in the previous section. Sustainability would also be elevated by taking a most holistic approach to civil society and the role of CSOs in civil society (discussed earlier) as it would encourage more strategic and comprehensive engagement beyond project-based initiatives.

A second pathway is creating content and discussions through online platforms. This may allow information to live on beyond the life cycle of the programme. The digital communities established by the consortium in year 2 were set up with the goal of becoming locally-owned – and the independence of Manasati-30 is an important contributing factor to this sustainability strategy. These online communities provide a (digital) space for ongoing dialogue and exchange, ensuring that stakeholders can continue to engage with the WPS agenda even after the programme has ended (assuming that consortium members are not required to continue website maintenance and moderation etc.)

A third pathway which is related to the second is supporting, elevating, and building the skills of individual activists, particularly youth and female activists who are predominantly active online. The consortium's social norms study found that these activists could play a significant role in driving change, but they need the support of fellow activists to be safe. Therefore, the study emphasized the importance of creating networks and collaborative efforts amongst these activists, as there is safety in numbers. Initiatives like creating women-only online platforms are a good starting point, but more comprehensive networks and collaborations should be developed to enhance their impact and sustainability.

A fourth pathway is establishing physical dialogue spaces that provide a forum for relevant stakeholders to interact around the WPS agenda, share experiences, and learn from each other. In particular, these spaces enable women-led and women-focused organizations to share best practices and join forces to advocate for issues of mutual interest. The idea is that forum members will create supportive relationships, and that these relationships will continue beyond the programme implementation period, and be an ongoing source of solidarity and collaboration for those who wish to advance the WPS agenda. While this pathway has merit, it is not yet clear if people (and particularly women) are already using the dialogue spaces in this way. That is, do they only interact during formal dialogue sessions, or have they already started to form relationships and networks that exist beyond the formal sessions? And if so, how do they use these networks, for example do women collaborate on advocacy or on relief or peacebuilding activities, or support each other in other way? Are there any visible trends in terms of which women utilize these networks (for instance, is it women who are already active within their own communities?) and for what? If the consortium could get a sense of these questions in the near future, they could reinforce the elements of the physical dialogue spaces that are most likely to continue to sustainability.

⁹⁴ The same point was made in interview 4



A fifth pathway is training and capacity-building of powerholders and community members. Training alone is unlikely to generate sustainability of the programme outcomes, but requires a clear strategy to continue and practice the knowledge gained, as well as disseminate the knowledge and engage the community. One strategy that the consortium uses is for trainees to share the message with others in their direct environment and then form committees within the community. It would be valuable to understand more about how these committees function, and whether they are genuinely contributing to the sustainability of programme goals. Training will be more likely to contribute to sustainability if it introduces participants to resources that they continue to use beyond the end of the programme. Two positive examples are the Memorandum of Understanding that was agreed for SGBV providers during a training for authorities on SGBV, and another is the interactive map of SGBV service providers that Manasati30 prepared and which will remain online after the programme ends.



9. CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

9.1 GENDER

Gender considerations are an integral consideration of all activities of the project and are addressed in detail in the preceding sections.

9.2 YOUTH

Youth are targeted throughout the programme by each of the consortium partners. Manasati30 is known to be the platform of youth. The majority (78%) of Manasati30's audience are people under the age of 34, and the number 30 in its name indicates that its primary target group is youth under 30. Equally, CARE and SOS have targeted youth in their respective activities. One challenge appears to be consistent disaggregation of data to capture the extent to which youth are engaged in different activities.

9.3 CLIMATE CHANGE

The programme has identified some opportunities to integrate the issue of climate change, and it may be valuable to elevate this issue in the second phase of the programme since it is relevant for advocacy and civil society. At a general level, the programme seeks to empower local communities, groups, and civil society to respond to social challenges, one of which may include climate change. The programme aims to build the agency, leadership, and participation of women and CSOs, which are foundational skills to then apply to the challenges of climate change.

In the survey carried out for this MTR, CSOs/MOs were asked if weather or environmental changes currently impacted their WPS programming.⁹⁵ Approximately half reported it did not; one-quarter said it did 'to some extent'; and one-quarter said it did 'to a limited extent.' Respondents indicated that their work was sometimes impeded by severe weather conditions such as flooding or heat waves and electricity outages. Of those whose programming was not affected by climate change, 70% felt that climate change will impact their WPS programming in future. This underscores the importance of proactively addressing the issue of climate change as an integral component of organizational management in order to mitigate the impact on programming in future. More specifically, it suggests that climate change risks and mitigation strategies should be taken into consideration and incorporated into the annual plans for the remaining years of the WPS programme.

CSOs/MOs appear to have limited risk mitigation strategies when environmental disasters occur, primarily relying on delaying activities until suitable implementation conditions prevail. Some organisations also occasionally reduced working hours (in response to heatwaves). Some would also allocate part of their budget to relief activities during environmental disasters. This resulted in a diversion of funds away from WPS programming. Additionally, some organisations intended to focus more on climate change programming and relief activities targeting those most affected by climate change.

Manasati-30 set its March topic as "The Impact of Climate Change," in order to highlight the impact that climate change has on women, the role that women can play in mitigating the effects of climate change, and the risks to women in doing so. As part of this, they conducted a survey with 1,774 respondents (of which one-third were women) and found that 79% of respondents acknowledged that climate change is a serious threat to women.⁹⁶ This indicates that this topic is of potentially wide interest to the community, affirmed by the fact that the survey results were reports in multiple news

⁹⁵ Face-to-face surveys – no: 50%, yes, to a limited extend: 8%, yes, to some extend: 25%, yes, to a large extend: 8%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – no: 64%, yes, to a limited extend: 0%, yes, to some extend: 29%, yes, to a large extend: 0%, I don't know: 7%

⁹⁶ The results reports can be found [here](#).



outlets.⁹⁷ The survey also uncovered positive examples of Yemeni women tackling climate change,⁹⁸ which were developed into different media products that received relatively high views.⁹⁹ This demonstrates that climate change may provide a gateway to gather different CSOs together and develop a wider advocacy campaign, as well as highlight the role that women have played in solving water disputes or other environment issues.

⁹⁷ Survey results were republished by several news outlets [Alayyam Newspaper](#), [Sahafahn](#), [South24](#), [Nuom News](#), [Alsjl News](#), [Dhamar Online](#), [Crater Sky](#), [Nabd](#).

⁹⁸ The link to the stories can be found [here](#).

⁹⁹ For example, a [story](#) about the environmentalist Irtefaa Al Qubaty, whose story received 93K views and 1.6k direct reactions.



10. RISKS

The Consortium has completed a detailed risk assessment, which is updated annually. This section does not review all risks in detail but draws attention to key issues that arose in the context of the MTR.

No significant security risks materialized in 2022 or 2023.¹⁰⁰ However, in 2022, a strong campaign against foreign NGOs was launched, accusing them of inciting non-Yemeni (and ‘immoral’) values. In response, the consortium adjusted the banners, posters, and brochures used for training and other public events in the communities so they don’t mention anything related to Women Peace and Security; instead, they indicate that the project is about inclusive community capacity building. They also reduced the visibility of CARE and increased the visibility of SOS since local NGOs were less affected by the campaign.¹⁰¹

NGOs and CSOs that work on the WPS agenda face direct and indirect constraints from the authorities. The consortium engages with authorities, but due to staff turnover amongst the authorities, their awareness of the programme is not consistent, and consortium members sometimes face difficulties at checkpoints. Allocating a considerable amount for seed grants for CSOs has helped the project get the authorities' buy-in.¹⁰² A compulsory *mahram* policy was issued in areas under the control of Ansar Allah. Still, even though it shouldn’t extend to areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government, women are sometimes asked why they are travelling without a *mahram*. To avoid this risk, women associated with the programme are now advised to travel with one of their male family members.

One financial risk is the depreciation of the EUR against the USD, as it affects the validity of budgets developed by consortium members in USD. The depreciation decreased the initial amount of USD by at least 15% (EUR/USD in 2021: 1,19 – in 2022: 0,98). If the rate continues to depreciate, there will need to be serious considerations of the impact on what is achievable given the reduction in funding.¹⁰³ This issue is compounded by the high inflation Yemen has experienced since 2022.¹⁰⁴ No other financial risks were identified as part of the MTR.

Another risk is that the strategies employed by the programme might be reaching primarily people who already hold more liberal views towards women’s participation and gender equality, particularly the online activities. This is something that would benefit from investigation as the second phase of the programme starts.

The governance setup of the programme, with CARE Nederland managing it from a distance, presents a risk that the programme misses opportunities to develop local capacities and learn from local knowledge. To mitigate this risk, it would be useful to consider whether SOS and/or Manasati30 can take on additional or different responsibilities within the consortium that would provide the opportunity to develop leadership and programming skills. SOS and Manasati30 should lead any discussions on this question, so that the direction reflects how they would like to develop as an organization and what is realistically within their capacity and interests. There is also one internal risk to consider, which is the phasing out of CARE Yemen. after the end of 2023. This will have a significant impact on the programme, and there's a need to re-envision how to proceed without their involvement.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Risk Analysis Update Year 2, also interviews with consortium members.

¹⁰¹ Risk Analysis Update Year 2, also interviews with consortium members.

¹⁰² Risk Analysis Update Year 2

¹⁰³ WPS 3 - Year 3 - Annual plan

¹⁰⁴ Risk Analysis Update Year 2

¹⁰⁵ Key informant interview with consortium partner, interview 4



11. LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

11.1 PROGRAMMATIC

The following good practices and lessons learned have arisen in the programme so far. Often, the ‘good practice’ came from a response to a programming challenge and involved a ‘lesson learned’ – therefore, we present the two ideas concurrently.

- As a good practice, the consortium has engaged a diverse team in different governorates that produce content that reflects the diversity of Yemeni society. The diversity in content is likely to have made it possible to appeal to wider audiences.
- All consortium members involve men in their training and campaigns (which addressed different aspects of Women in Peace and Security.) This is valuable as it helps to influence the views of the participating men (for example, post-training data collection by Manasati30 indicated that men who participated in training showed a more positive attitude towards women's participation). When these men have republished social media content on their pages, it also helps to reach a wider circle of men.
- As a good practice, consortium partners used their understanding and local knowledge of the Yemeni context to present sensitive issues in a socially permissible way. For example, Manasati30 attempted a campaign on positive masculinity. This campaign touched on issues that are sensitive in the context and encountered difficulties. Consequently, Manasati30 shifted its focus away from positive masculinities and towards fatherhood, a safer and more widely accepted topic. This technique allowed them to indirectly address sensitive issues while still advocating for their core messages. The lesson learned was that all WPS activities should be carefully considered in light of the context and tailored accordingly.
- As a good practice, there were some examples where consortium members leveraged training to achieve wider or more strategic outcomes. For example, training provided a mechanism to integrate the different domains – for example, SOS provided training for women on SGBV, some of whom were members of local youth groups that carried out initiatives on peacebuilding and social change. After the training, some women developed local action plans to carry out advocacy campaigns on issues related to SGBV and received small grants (seed Grants) from SOS to carry out the campaigns. Other times, training coincided with the appointment of trainees to strategic positions for women’s empowerment and protection.
- The data in the MTR suggests that one lesson learned is that training alone is not enough to generate change (see earlier section.) A related lesson learned was that the strategic use of training should happen from the design phase. However, it is important to note that this development also demonstrates the growing maturity of consortium partners. One partner noted that: *“many things have changed since [the proposal was designed in 2020], even our orientation as an institution. We used to focus on capacity building through training, but now, activities should be more focused [and strategic] than [just] capacity building.”*
- The use of digital platforms in a strategic way is a recurrent good practice. The consortium has learnt that digital platforms can be powerful tools for continuously engaging with communities and stakeholders. A related good practice is tailoring the online platforms to the audience. For example, creating a closed page that only admits women to enable them to participate and express their opinions freely, away from criticism from society. Influencers are another good practice, as they help the campaign widen its reach and appeal to different audiences.
- One good practice common to all consortium partners operating in Yemen is utilizing multiple activities and forms of media for advocacy campaigns (rather than only relying on a single type of media such as a video, for instance.) Campaigns have utilized art, contests, surveys, stories, videos,



music, physical outreach events, and media coverage. This increases the likelihood of the messaging reaching a wider audience and more diverse parts of the community.

- One good practice is the combination of online and offline activities. For example, partners sometimes host in-person dialogue sessions or other outreach activities while running an online campaign on the same topic. This practice should be further strengthened and replicated with several consortium partners collaborating.

11.2 PARTNERSHIP COLLABORATION

- A good practice regarding partnership collaboration is that each consortium partner brings different but complementary expertise and capacities to the programme, and the theory of change and programme activities aim to capitalize on these different but complementary roles. However, one of the most significant lessons learned is the need for a clear plan to operationalize the programme within the consortium. This plan should spell out the role of each partner and how day-to-day coordination will be managed. It should also address how the different work plans would align and how to strengthen connections between the consortium partners.
- One 'lesson learned' is the need to collaborate more within the consortium on joint advocacy goals, including campaigns and engagement with powerholders. While consortium members are each demonstrating good practice by utilizing multiple channels in each advocacy campaign, this should be replicated at the consortium level.
- There are times when consortium members elevate the work of each other and collaborate on the same advocacy messages. For example, when SOS produced a policy paper, it was republished by Manasati30.
- One lesson learned is the need for regular knowledge-sharing and joint learning sessions to address the relatively high staff turnover. This will also contribute to a stronger collective understanding of good practice in the Women in Peace and Security agenda.



12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The MTR reveals a complex picture of progress, particularly regarding changing social norms and practices related to women's roles and SGBV. While there are indications of positive shifts, the data highlights attitudinal barriers and challenges in assessing the programme's direct contribution due to the intricate environment. The programme's efforts to improve women's participation in relief, recovery, and peacebuilding activities face sensitivities and discrepancies in perceptions, emphasizing the need for continued efforts to address attitudinal barriers.

Regarding the partnership, moreover, the MTR highlights the need for improved coordination, integration of activities, and local ownership. However, there are also many opportunities. For example, the learning agenda has the and its potential to reshape the programme, along with the valuable partnership and flexible communication with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassy, which supports the programme's effectiveness and adaptability in the challenging Yemeni context.

Based on the MTR findings, we make the following recommendations for the second half of the programme:

Enhance collaboration within the consortium

- **The consortium should strengthen the coordination and integration of activities.** This includes developing a clear plan to operationalize the programme, particularly the theory of change; identifying a specific set of norms to collectively focus on; developing a joint advocacy plan; connecting online and offline activities between partners; and harmonizing monitoring. The learning agenda offers another important opportunity to collaborate.
- **Consortium members should create a joint strategy for engaging powerholders.** All consortium members work with powerholders. However, this is done separately. The consortium should develop a unified and joint campaign targeting specific powerholders to intensify these efforts and increase the likelihood of achieving change. Then, when workshops, meetings and diplomatic visits occur, the consortium can better target its activities and leverage the work of multiple partners. For example, the consortium may present powerholders with a policy paper backed by survey data and concurrently mobilize CSOs working with all partners to conduct targeted online and offline activities on the same topic.¹⁰⁶ In this way, the consortium could use all of its resources to build momentum on a topic at a strategic moment.
- **Strengthen the Yemen-based organisations' role in the consortium's governance and management, namely SOS and Manasati30.** In particular, the consortium may benefit from shifting coordination responsibilities to a Yemen-based partner since that would make face-to-face meetings, networking, and information sharing easier for those in-country. Since this requires resources and budget, it will be important to consider what is realistically possible. The learning agenda should also ideally be led by a Yemen-based consortium partner, in order to strengthen the relevance of the research products and their accessibility.

Intensify the collaboration model with CSOs

- **Develop criteria to decide which CSOs to continue supporting.** Based on the MTR, we suggest the following factors be considered, with priority given to CSOs that are more mature:
 - Location of the CSO. Currently, the consortium operates in both Aden and Taiz. The consortium should consider whether a smaller number of locations will lead to better advocacy outcomes (due to intensified efforts) or if the dual locations are still feasible.
 - Whether the CSO has conducted advocacy in the past
 - Whether the CSO has an advocacy strategy
 - Whether the CSO has developed a constituency or membership and consults with that constituency when developing campaigns

¹⁰⁶ Manasati-30 Annual Report



- **Support CSOs to mature in their advocacy efforts and as civil society actors more broadly.** At present, CSO advocacy initiatives are very project-based and donor-driven. There is no clear constituency or support base, and CSOs do not seem to look beyond each campaign to civil society's wider role and power to create change. In the second phase, the Consortium should work with CSOs to develop their capacity and vision as civil society actors. This includes:
 - Working with each CSO to identify a constituency or support base, identifying the issues that are important to that constituency, building an evidence base to support the desired change, and understanding the reference group that upholds the social norms that influence that issue (and whose perspective the advocacy is trying to change.) The Consortium has completed a mapping of powerholders, which could provide the basis for this.
 - Work with CSOs in a mentorship rather than capacity-building relationship, so that CSOs can enhance their decision-making authority in terms of setting programme priorities, designing activities, and determining funding allocation (while aligns with the change they requested in the CSO survey)
 - Support CSOs to identify actions beyond a single campaign, so that CSOs think more holistically about civil society's role in creating longer-term change.
- **Identify CSOs with similar advocacy goals and common constituencies and help them develop joint advocacy goals and campaigns.** That way, rather than CSOs doing diverse activities under the banner of WPS, they would work together towards a small number of specific advocacy goals. This will build on the programme's existing strength, supporting network-building amongst CSOs. Facilitating collaboration between the CSOs would allow CSOs to learn from each other (thus contributing to the shift in power to the global south by recognising the existing capacities of CSOs). It would also strengthen the impact of the advocacy campaign itself.
- **Use training strategically rather than 'only' as a capacity-building activity.** For example, drawing on good practices by different consortium members could include integrating dialogue with powerholders into the training sessions or providing ongoing mentorship after the training is completed to support advocacy initiatives.
- **Listen to CSO feedback and adjust the training to improve its relevance and effectiveness.** This includes holding all sessions in person; ensuring all training is tailored to the Yemeni context, especially when it relates to the WPS agenda; and adding sessions on strategic planning, fundraising, and proposal writing;
- **Showcase women's leadership by appointing female trainers.** This is already happening, but it is a good practice that should continue and be expanded wherever possible.

Look beyond the local landscape

- **Take steps to 'look beyond the local' and draw a connection to international platforms.** Currently, most activities focus on the community level, and there is little connection to wider international platforms. However, engaging with international platforms like the Yemen International Forum and discussions within the UN Security Council is also vital to increase the impact of the consortium's work. Consortium partners should identify ways to connect more with the multilateral and international discussions surrounding Yemen, particularly now that the consortium has built expertise on the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In doing this, the consortium would benefit from the Ministry and Embassy's support to strategize how to develop its advocacy and WPS work at the national or international level, including support to identify potential targets, allies, and ways to frame advocacy messages that engage an international audience. The Ministry and Embassy may also support by connecting the consortium to appropriate diplomatic channels, including the UN and the EU, as well as advising on the political landscape associated with those channels.

Invest in building sustainability

- **Intensify support to a smaller number of CSOs.** To date, the programme has supported a large number of CSOs that have mixed capacities and maturity. Going forward, the programme would benefit from a more targeted approach that provides more intensive support to fewer CSOs that



can apply the training and implement effective advocacy campaigns. This likely means identifying more mature CSOs rather than community-level CSOs. The programme would also benefit from strengthening the connection between training and implementation and providing more intensive support to CSOs during the implementation phase. A more targeted approach would also enable the Consortium to target training to the specific requirements of CSOs and develop the training materials in a more consultative way.

- **Better integrate the offline and online activities.** One way to do so may be to expand the work the consortium does with role models offline. Some consortium members have identified male role models active in online forums as allies. One suggestion is to consider working with some of these role models to create an offline impact. This would require careful consideration of the profile of the role model and how this might be viewed in a specific context. In addition, ensuring the safety of these role models and those they work with is paramount. As discussed earlier, the social norm study recommended creating a support group for those who take on this responsibility to ensure they are given guidance and support as role models. This can help ensure the success and safety of these initiatives.
- **The consortium should identify and support (via advocacy) political decisions supporting women's leadership that might be controversial for communities or authorities.** For instance, the appointment of five women as Deputy Directors of police departments in Taiz City was subsequently overturned. The consortium should consider how it can strengthen and support such decisions to reduce the risk of reversing these positive developments.
- **Integrate issues related to climate change to the consortium's collaboration with CSOs.** For example, to help CSOs develop risk mitigation strategies for climate change or to conduct advocacy related to climate change.
- **Consortium members should consider forming and leading a small group of INGOs and CSOs dedicated to women, peace, and security.** The group could provide a platform to identify, design, and collaborate on advocacy initiatives and WPS programming, especially when social or political restrictions are imposed, or when local organizations face challenges from authorities in either the North or the South. It would also provide a forum to share and discuss experiences and knowledge about WPS programming. While the primary focus of the group would be strengthening collective advocacy and expertise on WPS programming, it could also provide a platform to engage with donors, showcasing their expertise gained over the last several years and making recommendations regarding future funding direction. This proactive approach could lead to more opportunities for funding, as the Yemeni context is complex, and having the voice of local actors is invaluable. Such a platform would encourage local actors to actively shape and advocate for how women peace and security initiatives can and should work, thereby potentially attracting more opportunities their way.¹⁰⁷
- **Build local ownership of the consortium's online platforms.** This may involve Manasati30 retaining primary responsibility for its platforms, but would nonetheless require more diverse and sustainable funding to ensure the longevity of the platforms after the end of this grant. Alternatively, consortium members may be able to identify ways to handover responsibility and oversight of the forums to local activists.

¹⁰⁷ Key informant interview with MFA and Embassy, interview 1

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RESEARCH TOOLS

TERMS OF REFERENCE



WPS3 Yemen - MTR
ToR_Final.docx

KII TOOLS



1 - KII Tool (MTR) -
Consortium Partner:



2 - KII Tool (MTR) -
Powerholders - FINAL



3 - KII Tool (MTR) -
MFA and Embassy -



4 - KII CSOs Tool
(MTR) - FINAL.docx



5a - KII Seed Grants
- CARE FINAL.docx



5b - KII Seed Grants
- SOS FINAL.docx



6 - KII Manasati-30
Influencers - Contriik



7a - FGD Tool (MTR)
- FINAL.docx



7b - Vignette Study
Tool (MTR) - FINAL.d

HOUSEHOLD SURVEY TOOL



Annex 4 -
Household Survey T

CSO/MO SURVEY TOOL



Annex 5 - CSO and
Media Partner Surve



ANNEX 2: LEARNING AGENDA

Topic

1. CSOs and their engagement with communities and powerholders

Learning questions

- What are characteristics of CSOs that make them best connected to communities and powerholders (formal and informal), and interconnected with other CSOs?
- Are the CSOs engaged in the project representing the voice of the diverse segments of society?

2. Male engagement in the WPS programme

- What are the characteristics of male allies who discourage discriminatory norms and practices?
- What are the external factors that influence the willingness and unwillingness of men and boys to support / discourage discriminatory social norms and practices?
- What are the approaches that seem successful to make an impact in changing social and gender norms at household and community levels? (e.g., role models, male groups, dialogue spaces).
- Why is the positive attitude of communities and families towards women's meaningful influence in relief, recovery, and peace processes in Yemen on the decline? What strategies can the project take to prevent the impact of such negative development in the project result?

3. Engagement with supportive/non supportive powerholders

- Who are the leaders that are not supportive (blockers) and why?
- What works and what does not when engaging with supportive and non-supportive leaders to influence their ideas?
- Which other leaders (social media influencers, community workers / women leaders at community level, community mobilisers) can we engage with and how?

4. Relationship between Women's Economic Justice and Women Peace and Security

- What are the exact support women (with all social, financial, educational and physical background) need to be able to influence peace processes?
- How can we leverage results from programmes economically empowering women?
- How do we know that the women from challenging social, physical and economic backgrounds are also empowered and empowerment in this regard is not only the prerogative of the elite class women?

5. Developing advocacy activities in a fluid and complex context.

- What is the exact support women (with all social, financial, educational, and physical background) need to be able to influence peace processes?
- How can we leverage results from programmes economically empowering women?



ANNEX 3: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ANALYSIS

Table 10. Washington Group Questions (Aden)

Question	No difficulty	Some difficulty	A lot of difficulty	Cannot do at all
1. Do you have difficulty seeing, even with glasses?	85%	11%	3%	1%
2. Do you have difficulty hearing, even with a hearing aid?	88%	7%	4%	1%
3. Do you have difficulty walking or climbing stairs?	92%	4%	3%	1%
4. Do you have difficulty remembering or concentrating?	96%	4%	0%	0%
5. Do you have difficulty taking care of yourself (washing and dressing)?	97%	3%	0%	0%
6. Do you have difficulty communicating (understanding or being understood)?	91%	3%	5%	1%

Table 11. Washington Group Questions (Taiz)

Question	No difficulty	Some difficulty	A lot of difficulty	Cannot do at all
1. Do you have difficulty seeing, even with glasses?	71%	23%	7%	0%
2. Do you have difficulty hearing, even with a hearing aid?	87%	11%	3%	0%
3. Do you have difficulty walking or climbing stairs?	77%	12%	8%	3%
4. Do you have difficulty remembering or concentrating?	67%	31%	3%	0%
5. Do you have difficulty taking care of yourself (washing and dressing)?	85%	8%	7%	0%
6. Do you have difficulty communicating (understanding or being understood)?	83%	12%	5%	0%

Figure 6. Are you a member or volunteer, or have you been a member or volunteered for an organisation that engages in relief or peacebuilding work?




Figure 7. How often do women in your community participate in ... activities?




Figure 8. How often do women in your community participate in ... activities




Figure 9. How often does the following occur?




Figure 10. Women do not have the opportunity or are prevented from participating in activities that support




Figure 11. Men ... women to participate in peacebuilding activities




Figure 12. Men ... women to participate in relief and recovery activities




Table 12. To what degree does this attitude exist in your neighbourhood?

Attitude	Overall	Male	Female	Muhamasheen	PwD
1. It is important for women to participate in the peace process	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.4
2. Women should not be involved in peacebuilding	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5
3. There should be more involvement of women in peacebuilding	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.4
4. It is important for women to participate in relief and recovery efforts	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.4
5. Women should not be involved in relief and recovery efforts	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.1
6. There should be more involvement of women in relief and recovery efforts	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.2
7. A woman who participates in peacebuilding activities will be criticised by the community	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.6
8. A woman who participates in relief and recovery activities will be criticised by the community	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.6



Figure 13. Women ...




Figure 14. Spoken out against discriminatory gender norms





Figure 15. Have you ever been consulted by a civil society organisation for input since 2021?



ANNEX 3: CSO AND MEDIA ORGANIZATION SURVEY

Figure 16. What activities does your organisation carry out?




Figure 17. Who are the target participants or beneficiaries of your organisation?





Figure 18. Have changes in the weather or environmental changes had any impact on the WPS programming of your organisation?¹⁰⁸



¹⁰⁸ Face-to-face surveys – no: 50%, yes, to a limited extend: 8%, yes, to some extend: 25%, yes, to a large extend: 8%, I don't know: 8%
 Online surveys – no: 64%, yes, to a limited extend: 0%, yes, to some extend: 29%, yes, to a large extend: 0%, I don't know: 7%



Figure 19. Do you think that changes in the weather or environmental changes will impact WPS programming in the future?¹⁰⁹





Figure 20. What challenges do you face in establishing an advocacy strategy?



¹⁰⁹ Face-to-face surveys – no: 0%, yes, to a limited extent: 33%, yes, to some extent: 67%, yes, to a large extent: 0%, I don't know: 0%
 Online surveys – no: 22%, yes, to a limited extent: 11%, yes, to some extent: 33%, yes, to a large extent: 11%, I don't know: 22%



Figure 21. Can your organisation mobilise a large network of people in support of advocacy efforts? ¹¹⁰




Figure 22. Does your organisation have a system for communicating with your network about advocacy efforts to gain their support? ¹¹¹




Figure 23. Does your organisation regularly work to expand the size of its network engaged in advocacy efforts? ¹¹²





Figure 24. Does your organisation have strong relationships with ...? ¹¹³



¹¹⁰ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 25%, yes, to some extent: 67%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 0%, I don't know: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 36%, yes, to some extent: 36%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%, I don't know: 0%

¹¹¹ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 58%, yes, a little: 33%, no: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 7%, yes, to some extent: 36%, yes, a little: 50%, no: 7%

¹¹² Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 25%, yes, to some extent: 41%, yes, a little: 33%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 29%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 21%, no: 7%

¹¹³ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 33%, yes, to some extent: 42%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 14%, yes, to some extent: 57%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%



Figure 25. Are you part of a network or informal collaboration that can support joint advocacy efforts? ¹¹⁴





Figure 26. Is your organisation worried about conducting advocacy due to potential security risks¹¹⁵ or negative impacts on their relationships with authorities¹¹⁶ or the community¹¹⁷.



¹¹⁴ Face-to-face surveys – yes: 67%, no: 25%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes: 50%, no: 43%, I don't know: 7%

¹¹⁵ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 8%, yes, to some extent: 17%, yes, a little: 33%, no: 42%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 7%, yes, to some extent: 36%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 29%

¹¹⁶ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 8%, yes, a little: 17%, no: 75%, I don't know: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 21%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 43%, I don't know: 7%

¹¹⁷ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 8%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 7%, yes, a little: 14%, no: 64%, I don't know: 14%



Figure 27. Is your organisation worried about conducting activities because of its potential negative impact on female beneficiaries¹¹⁸ and your staff¹¹⁹?




Figure 28. Has your organisation engaged in advocacy in the past?¹²⁰





Figure 29. Did you involve the community in the design of advocacy messages and activities?¹²¹



¹¹⁸ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 8%, yes, a little: 8%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 7%, no: 83%, I don't know: 0%

¹¹⁹ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 17%, no: 75%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 0%, yes, to some extent: 0%, yes, a little: 21%, no: 71%, I don't know: 7%

¹²⁰ Face-to-face surveys – yes, a lot: 8%, yes, some: 50%, yes, but very little: 8%, no: 25%, I don't know: 8%

Online surveys – yes, a lot: 21%, yes, some: 43%, yes, but very little: 7%, no: 21%, I don't know: 7%

¹²¹ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 13%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 20%, yes, to some extent: 40%, yes, a little: 20%, no: 20%



Figure 30. Did this include women¹²² and youth¹²³?





Figure 31. Did you involve participants in the implementation of advocacy activities?¹²⁴



¹²² Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 29%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 29%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 75%, yes, a little: 13%, no: 0%

¹²³ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 14%, yes, to some extent: 43%, yes, a little: 43%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 25%, yes, to some extent: 63%, yes, a little: 13%, no: 0%

¹²⁴ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 13%, yes, to some extent: 50%, yes, a little: 25%, no: 13%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 30%, yes, to some extent: 40%, yes, a little: 20%, no: 10%



Figure 32. Did this include women¹²⁵ and youth¹²⁶?




Figure 33. To what degree do local authorities support SGBV programming?¹²⁷





Figure 34. To what degree has the level of support from local authorities towards SGBV programming changed in the past two years?¹²⁸



¹²⁵ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 29%, yes, to some extent: 71%, yes, a little: 0%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 22%, yes, to some extent: 67%, yes, a little: 11%, no: 0%

¹²⁶ Face-to-face surveys – yes, to a large extent: 14%, yes, to some extent: 71%, yes, a little: 14%, no: 0%

Online surveys – yes, to a large extent: 22%, yes, to some extent: 67%, yes, a little: 11%, no: 0%

¹²⁷ Face-to-face surveys – very supportive: 8%, somewhat supportive: 25%, neither supportive nor unsupportive: 17%, somewhat unsupportive: 33%, very unsupportive: 17%, I don't know: 0%

Online surveys – very supportive: 0%, somewhat supportive: 43%, neither supportive nor unsupportive: 14%, somewhat unsupportive: 7%, very unsupportive: 14%, I don't know: 21%

¹²⁸ Face-to-face surveys – became a lot more supportive: 0%, became somewhat more supportive: 25%, no change: 50%, became somewhat less supportive: 8%, became a lot less supportive: 17%, I don't know: 0%

Online surveys – became a lot more supportive: 7%, became somewhat more supportive: 29%, no change: 29%, became somewhat less supportive: 7%, became a lot less supportive: 0%, I don't know: 29%



Figure 35. Have there been any instances in the last two years during which local authorities contributed to SGBV protection, prevention, and response?

